PAST AND PRESENT OF NORTH-SOUTH COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT

By Mónica Hirst and Blanca Antonini

SCENARIOS AND CHALLENGES IN SOUTH SOUTH COOPERATION 30 YEARS AFTER THE BUENOS AIRES DECLARATION

By Myriam Colacrai and Research Team

REPORT OF THE IBERO AMERICAN ACADEMIC MEETING ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

General Directorate of International Cooperation
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SOUTH-SOUTH Cooperation

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From the start of the current decade, a series of events have taken place in the international arena which have given new drive, as well as a new place in the political agenda, to International Cooperation (IC), while at the same time putting forth new issues concerning the mechanisms which can be used to improve its implementation and effectiveness.

In this respect, the country presents the need for a new conceptualization of IC – meant to move past the vertical and paternalistic vision which persists in the traditional North-South Cooperation (NSC) – to establish association mechanisms which are more effective in order to respond to the current demands of the peoples of the world. This new conceptualization is still being debated and elaborated, and for its development there must be a fertile dialogue between theory and practice, in which Academia has a central role.

Despite the long history between the General Directorate of International Cooperation (Direccion General de Cooperacion Internacional or DGCIN) and the universities, there hasn’t been a continuity over time, nor has it managed to reach its full potential with regard to mutual learning opportunities which would be expected given the experience and quality of the players involved. The range of institutions of higher education, long recognized for being of great quality and diversity, has been enriched in recent times by the appearance of new institutions and educational options, among which are Training Centers and Programs aimed specifically at issues related to IC.

For this reason, the strategic planning of the DGCIN in 2009 - 2010 establishes as an objective the strengthening of participation of Argentine universities in its activities, promoting their collaboration in the programs of South-South cooperation that the country participates in, developing effective communication mechanisms (meetings, information exchanges) to promote the coordination of actions related to the country’s priorities in its foreign policy, analyzing and promoting mechanisms which would allow for the universities to provide consulting and training to the DGCIN itself, supporting the creation of cooperation networks and communities of practice on IC-related issues among Argentine universities, as well as between them and universities from other countries, organizing events with universities from other countries that are currently working, or would like to work, with Argentine universities, in addition to other actions.

Within this framework, the DGCIN decided to explore the universe of academic production
on issues of international cooperation, promote debate on these topics among qualified experts, and seek its dissemination among interested parties. In 2009, two meetings were organized, promoted and carried out with educators and researchers from the country’s universities, which have centers or training activities on these topics. Their respective works – prepared especially for these events – can be found in this issue.

With this contribution, the DGCIN of the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs begins a series of publications aimed at:

› **Disseminating Argentine thoughts and experiences on the topic of International Cooperation.**
› **Stimulating reflection and debate on relevant current topics, and especially regarding the content and strategies of the new international cooperation architecture.**
› **Promoting International exchanges in relation to these topics.**
› **Stimulating the dissemination of good practices on the topic.**

The contents of this issue:

A. The first part of this document includes the works presented during the first academic meeting – held in the Foreign Ministry in March of 2009 – by Mónica Hirst and Blanca Antonini, from Torcuato Di Tella University, and by the team from the Center for Research on International Cooperation and Development (Centro de Investigación en Cooperación Internacional y Desarrollo or CICI+D) of the National University of San Martín (UNSAM), conformed by Miryam Colacrai (Director), Alejandra Kern (Main Researcher), Miguel Vallone, Valeria Pattacini, Lara Weisstaub (Researchers).

The document “Pasado y Presente de la Cooperación Norte-Sur para el Desarrollo” (“Past and Present of North-South Cooperation for Development”) by Hirst and Antonini aims to summarize the points which have the greatest impact on the configuration of this form of cooperation. On the one hand, it seeks to review the evolution of IC policies put forth by the developed countries starting from the decolonization period; on the other, it summarizes the main criticisms with regard to development cooperation, from a conceptual standpoint as well as an operational one, related to the new modalities of cooperation, delegated, decentralized and/or triangular.

The work has three parts and a conclusion. The first part deals with the configuration of the North-South agenda, the second with North-South Cooperation after the Cold War, and the third with the aspects of development cooperation in the present day. The conclusion highlights the new framework of challenges imposed on North-South Cooperation by the global economic crisis, and suggests a regional look through differentiated political options with regard to the problem.

At the same time, the document “Escenarios y Desafíos de la Cooperación Sur-Sur a
30 años de la Declaración de Buenos Aires” ("Scenarios and Challenges in South-South Cooperation 30 years after the Buenos Aires Declaration") by the CICI+D of the UNSAM has a double purpose. On the one hand, to do a follow-up of the evolution of IC in recent decades, marking the revaluation of South-South Cooperation (SSC) during the current international financial crisis. On the other, it seeks to analyze the key conceptual points which sustain the definition of SSC in a sampling of Latin American countries, related to the possibility of designing a common regional strategy on this issue.

B. The second part of the document contains the presentations and conclusions elaborated in the 1st Iberoamerican Academic Meeting on International Cooperation, organized in November of 2009 by the Iberoamerican General Secretariat (Secretaría General Iberoamericana or SEGIB), the UNSAM and the DGCIN of the Argentine Foreign Ministry.

The objectives of this meeting were to:

a. Analyze the state of research and academic training on international cooperation in the Iberoamerican region, with special emphasis being placed on the Latin American countries.

b. Strengthen the exchange of researchers and educators who participate in training activities related to international development cooperation through the exchange of different outlooks and perspectives on how to approach the problems in this field.

c. Promote cross-institutional communication in order to multiply cooperation possibilities between participating institutions.

d. Stimulate the formation of an academic community which systematically reflects on the practices and consequences of international development cooperation, which is capable of proposing actions to improve its social usefulness and which can coordinate with the efforts of the Iberoamerican Conference in this field.

Presenters in the meeting included Jairo Agudelo Taborda, Director of the Escuela Latinoamericana de Cooperación y Desarrollo (USBCTG); Tomás Mallo, responsible for the Latin America Program at the Research Center on Latin American Studies and International Cooperation (Centro de Estudios para América Latina y la Cooperación Internacional or CEALCI) of the Carolina Foundation; Jorge Balbis, Executive Secretary of the Latin American Association of Organizations for the Promotion of Development (Asociación Latinoamericana de Organizaciones de Promoción al Desarrollo or ALOPI); Cristina Xalma (SEGIB, who presented the report on South-South Cooperation in Iberoamerica); Alejandra Kern, researcher at the CICI+D (School of Humanities); Miguel Vallone, Director of the Masters Program on International Cooperation of the School of Humanities at the UNSAM; Grace Jaramillo, Director of the Masters Program on International Negotiation and Cooperation at the Latin
American School of Social Sciences (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales or FLACSO – Ecuador); Martín Rívero lila, Director of the Department of International Cooperation in the Office of Planning and Budget of Uruguay; Minister Marco Farani, Director of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Agencia Brasileira de Cooperación); Ambassador Julia Levi, Director of the General Directorate of International Cooperation.

The DGCIN hopes that this contribution is of use in order to enrich the actions undertaken by the countries in the region with regard to international cooperation, contributing to a greater effectiveness and the formation of professional networks which allow for the exchange of experiences and the consolidation of common work strategies.

At the same time, it pushes for the strengthening of the dialogue between Academia and those responsible for generating IC policy, in order to produce a scenario in which theory and practice feed off of each other in working toward a more global consideration of the processes that must be implemented in order to face the challenges involved in generating strategies to resolve problems as pressing as are those of equality and poverty.
PAST AND PRESENT OF NORTH-SOUTH COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT

Coordination: Mónica Hirst
Elaboration of Text: Blanca Antonini y Mónica Hirst
Assistance: Jazmín Sierra
Collaboration by: Victoria Paniagua

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The modern path of International Cooperation for Development (ICD) is a relatively true mirror-image of the evolution of North-South relations. In the last 60 years, the content of ICD has been an indicator of the willingness of industrialized nations to attend to the needs of developing countries with regard to technical assistance, the fight against poverty, economic reform and, more recently, democratic governance and institutional strengthening. By combining regulatory and instrumental attributes, of the donor countries as well as the multilateral organizations committed to development assistance, North-South cooperation has always been associated with two key elements: (i) the range of resources for “soft power” that foster international politics; (ii) the uneven conditions of distribution of wealth and power in the global system.

In terms of history, the place of ICD in the global agenda has always been related to the fundamental needs that appear in the developing world in relation to the decolonization period post-1945. In conceptual terms, its content includes bilateral development assistance policies from a group of industrialized countries, the directives of the World Bank and multilateral agencies dedicated to issues of development –IAADB, FAO, ILO, among others–, the U.N.’s social agenda as determined by the demands of Third World countries in the General Assembly and institutionalized by the ECO-SOC and the UNDP and the legacy of structuralist economic thought which from its inception has attributed to international cooperation a relevant role in reducing the gap between the center and the periphery. In more recent times, prominent segments of civilian organizations, sub-national governments and private foundations have also played a part.

The political, economic and technological changes that have taken place in the past six decades –which have transformed but not alleviated the North-South division in the international system– have resulted in new challenges for ICD. It comprises different strategies and multiple possibilities for interaction (N-S, S-S, S-N-S) between donors and recipients, in spheres with different degrees of urgency and need, which involve governments, regional and international organization, civilian organizations and private foundations.

Within the context of the economic globalization and the end of the Cold War, an important facet of the international system was the increase of inequality in the distribution of intra- and inter-state material resources and social conditions. The worsening of North-South, and South-South, asymmetries has resulted in the space for development cooperation initiatives in many cases being occupied by humanitarian assistance. As we observe an expansion in the demand for cooperation, we are run-

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The end of the bipolar order and the accelerated globalization process had a major impact with regard to development aid. With new and serious imbalances in the North-South scenario, there was a new drive from the community of donors, as well as multilateral organizations, with different purposes and directives. The countries of the OECD expressed, both individually and collectively, their intent to perfect instruments and improve results, while new global commitments were agreed on that counted with support from the United Nations System and the European Union.

The South, on its end, also fine-tuned its demands and diversified the type of participation and contributions of those countries which find themselves in a better position through the promotion of supportive cooperation among peers. A new wave of technical and political readings on the subject contributed to solidifying this drive in search of truly transformational results. Despite this situation, there seem to be many vulnerable and questionable “flanks” that are not being taken into consideration. Possibly the most serious is the lack of communication and dialogue between the thinking and operational universes of the North and the South which, added to the chronic deficit in operational coordination, simultaneously compromises the whole and its parts.

Currently, the appearance of new players and guidelines in the North, as well as the innovative proposals from the South, has opened renewed perspectives for ICD. It is worth asking what the possibilities are that both universes will be able to articulate their synergies and ascertaining whether or not strategies like triangular and/or decentralized cooperation can provide a path to follow in this respect.

This document aims to: i) review the evolution of international cooperation policies...
from the donor countries, highlighting the expansion and new conceptualization of development assistance from the decolonization stage; ii) present a summary of the criticisms related to the new gestures of the North and the multilateral organizations with regard to development cooperation.

From a conceptual standpoint, the aim is to consider the formulations from the OECD that attempt to perfect the donor-recipient relationship. From an operational standpoint, we can highlight the traditional as well as the new modalities of assistance applied by the three pillars of IC; governments, multilateral organizations and civilian organizations.

In order to carry out this proposal, this work is divided into three parts: the first offers a historical overview of ICD as of 1945; the second section addresses the period of change produced by the end of the bipolar world and the new conceptual developments—especially the notion of human development—incorporated into the launch of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); the third section focuses on the current scenario of North-South cooperation, the meaning of the “Big Push”, the new players in the community of donors and the expectations created by the appearance of a segment of middle-income countries (MICs) that are beginning to intensify their international presence as donors.

In the conclusion, in addition to returning to certain aspects regarding the Big Push, the text underlines the new framework of challenges for North-South cooperation imposed by the global economic crisis and suggests a view of the South based on different political options.
The Configuration of International Cooperation

A. The Genesis of Cooperation: North-North and North-South

While the European reconstruction was inaugurating an international agenda of cooperation, it also introduced an insurmountable framework of differentiation between North and South with regard to international economic assistance. Its label as a strategic priority of the United States, reinforced by the bipolar context, was always supported by the explanations with respect to the economic need to ensure the recovery of the industrial base of European capitalism.

Already at that time, international cooperation was perceived as a tool which could be used to stabilize countries that had been devastated and societies that had been punished by war and that might veer toward radical movements. A link was also established between international cooperation and the design of a new multilateral architecture. Aiding countries in their objective to advance toward economic and social well-being was one of the goals enumerated in the United Nations Charter; a commitment which, although conceptualized with a universal scope, was also influenced by the liberal-institutionalist thinking of the United States². The writers of the Charter were convinced that the scenarios whose consequent crises, unemployment and economic reduction had led to the rise of European totalitarian regimes in the previous decades should not be repeated. However, those that advocated for the inclusion of full employment as a goal were forced to give up position to those that voiced their support for liberal conventionalism and the more strategic priorities.

Conditioned by the contentious objectives of the United States, and despite adopting the universalist lexicon, the actions put forth by the assistance policies tended to exclude more than they included. In the first place, the socialist group - although representing approximately one quarter of the global population- was not taken into consideration in the process put forth by the capitalist order for political and ideological reasons. This segment was subordinate to the functioning of a system of security and defense which imposed new European borders and relied on an economic model that opted for collectivism and centralized long-term planning for the State. In this context, the majority of the underdeveloped countries gave up the possibility to articulate their development processes with experiences that prioritized the presence of the State as a motor for production and social transformation.

The escalation of tension between the two superpowers modified the (high-level) international politics and prevented the consolidation of the projected global architecture based on values and commitments.

The economic funds created by the British (Colonial Development Fund) and French (Fonds d’Investissement pour le Développement Économique et Social) governments, created in 1945 and 1946, respectively, had limited resources. Already in the 1950s two unspoken and encapsulated realities emerged: On the one hand, the institutional order that disciplined and protected liberal interests and values and which was based on the leadership of the United Status, and on the other, the confrontation between Washington D.C. and Moscow that conditioned the political and global security agendas.

Afterwards, the influx of a great number of new states into the U.N. which resulted from the de-colonization process marked a change in the debates of the global organization. The issue of development made its way into the multilateral agenda, which forced a redefinition - at least within the sphere of the United Nations System – of the narrow focus with which cooperation was being conceived in the immediate post-war period.

The economic support schemes between the ex metropolises and the ex colonies were accompanied by a rhetoric that supported independence and, at the same time, established links that implied a new period of subordination and asymmetries. In the period of independence of the African and Asian nations the metropolitan governments assumed greater responsibilities in the structuring of state administrative machinery in their former “possessions”. Both in the case of the formation of the French community as with the British Commonwealth, there was a sense of continuity of the “civilizing” mission, sustained by the local elite that advocated reworking the links between the old empires and the new states. The establishment of a neo-colonialist pattern of interaction starting in the 50s and 60s influenced the tone of the North-South agenda and, in fact, contributed to preventing the formation of nationalities aimed at self-sufficiency.

This process responds to political pressure from Washington on the former European powers, especially Great Britain and France, to quickly dismantle their system of colonies. But there was a visible lack of concern with regard to the future that awaited this group of new nations that had attained their sovereignty. The cosmetics of the independence processes in Asia and Africa placed in the background the real economic viability of these countries. The fact that the cooperation policies designed by the United States and its allies excluded the colonial


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world that still operated within metropolitan dynamics made it even more difficult to break the conditioning factors. In addition, the apprehensions concerning the reach of Soviet ideology in the young Third World governments led Washington to prioritize military aid as a principal instrument to ensure the defense of its political and economic ideals. In this context, the development aid coming from the industrialized nations and the multilateral organizations began to be strongly conditioned by the positions maintained by these countries on matters of international policy and security.

The European reconstruction had to reestablish the physical, political and institutional infrastructures, as well as achieve the rehabilitation of the populations affected by the war so that they might retake the course of their evolution in times of peace.

These were countries that already had human resources with the training and the background in institutional matters and production organization that could facilitate the assimilation of aid in order to once again take up political life and the capitalist process of accumulation that was interrupted by the war.

It is a curious fact that the post-war reconstruction in Germany and Japan stimulated these countries in the second half of the 20th century to become relevant donors of ICD. In both cases, their condition as “defeated” countries affected the legitimacy of their neo-imperialistic positions and stimulated internal consensuses which favored altruistic and cooperation-oriented policies in conjunction with developing countries. The establishment of cooperation policies which were not connected to

5. In 1960 over 50% of all aid from the United States to Third World countries had military purposes. See: Westad, Odd Arne, The Global Cold War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pg. 26


7. For a detailed retelling of the European reconstruction, its political, economic and cultural dimensions see: Judt, Tony, Postwar: A history of Europe since 1945, Penguin Books, 2005

8. A recent analysis which highlights the importance of the historical legacy with regard to post-war reconstruction in Germany and Japan is carried out by Christopher Coyne. See: Coyne, Christopher J., ‘After War: The political Economy of Exporting Democracy’ Stanford University Press, 2008.

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their colonialist histories—and in this case unrelated to the context of post-conflict reconstruction—has also been observed in the Scandinavian region. Countries such as Sweden, Denmark and Norway became examples of North-South cooperation from the initial stages of the Asian and African de-colonization processes.

The new Asian and African states, in which the majority of the global population lived, became the principal destinations for development assistance in the 1960s, 70s and 80s. Their production systems were characterized by the juxtaposition of an economy based on the extraction of raw materials by companies from the colonial powers and a more traditional economic system based on family agriculture, crafts or other forms of local production. In addition, the precarious domestic conditions, which prevented processes of social and economic change, quickly became attractive scenarios for intervention by the global superpowers interested in expanding the projection of their ideological models.

Within this context, the conception of development by the industrialized countries was that of a process impregnated with the notion of progress, capable of lifting the non-industrialized nations from their backward economic situation and allowing them to achieve the economic standard that the industrialized nations had attained. Harry Truman, in his Inaugural Address of 1949, alluded to the need to place at the disposal of these countries, which he termed “underdeveloped”, all the benefits of scientific and economic progress through a development program based on the concept of “democratic fair dealing”.

However, the market that these non-industrialized countries were supposed to become a part of, had a space for insertion already defined by the economic interests of the commercial powers and operated under previously established practices. Having been absent at the time in which the market was formed, the young states could not insert themselves other than through terms that had been set externally, thus placing them at a distinct initial disadvantage. The safeguards included in the agreements which constituted the organizations of Bretton Woods, which were meant to protect them from the numerical superiority of the Third World countries, were not able to prevent bilateral aid from becoming the preferred avenue for the United States, who was joined by other world powers as their economies grew. The assistance lent in accordance with strategic or economic interests reduced the risk that a change in policy could have repercussions on the direction of international cooperation.

The donors of bilateral aid used to tie it to the purchase of equipment and services from their own private and public companies and the criteria for assigning funds was


related to political, strategic and commercial objectives, thus making assistance an instrument of influence for the donor country. It would take decades for this form of conditioned aid to become a topic of discussion and questioned within the spheres of assistance.

Inspired by the Europe of the late 1940s, most of the flow of aid from the World Bank to former colonies and other Third World countries were aimed at large works of physical infrastructure which required capital, machinery and technology from the industrialized nations. The underlying vision in these initiatives was that they would lead to a more dynamic economy in the recipient countries, which would allow them to overcome prostration, hunger and poverty. The social agenda would surface on its own as a consequence of the changes in the economy and it would be managed by the national governments.\(^\text{12}\) The assistance projects responded to assessments of needs carried out by technicians from the donor nations, who in addition to having little knowledge of the recipient rarely considered the capabilities and expectations of the local communities, whose lives would be profoundly affected, usually in a negative way.\(^\text{13}\) The interference in the domestic production systems of food and other basic elements generated a dependency and turned out to be counterproductive in the attempt to achieve the objectives of eradicating hunger and underdevelopment.\(^\text{14}\)

In the late 1960s the questioning of cooperation—regardless of whether it was of bilateral or multilateral origin (especially that carried out by the World Bank)—forced a reconsideration of the policies and strategies of the assistance programs. More importance was given to the issue of “absorption capacity” of the recipients of aid, which is to say, it was evaluated whether there were human resources and national institutions capable of taking advantage of international aid efficiently and transparently for the

\(^{12}\) The few exceptions to this rule were food assistance programs promoted by the FAO, with a strong welfare mentality and with no thought to promote future sustainability.

\(^{13}\) There are numerous recorded cases: the construction of a dam that changes the course of a river, a highway that forces them to leave their homes and plots, or an attempt to mechanize agricultural production which results in abandoning traditional crops for others meant for grain export for the global market, which, at the same time, is run by large agricultural export conglomerates. For critical reviews of these development assistance policies, see: Schnaider, Ann Kathryn, “A Critique of the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy for India”; International River Network, 07/19/2004; Available online at: http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/CASIndia2004Critique.pdf (consulted 03/05/2009); Goettlich, Paul, “The Green Revolution. A Critical Look”; Available online at: http://www.mindfully.org/Farm/Green-Revolution.htm (consulted 03/05/2009).

\(^{14}\) See: Black, Maggie, Op cit.
benefit of the local population. Faced with a situation of “fatigue”, the World Bank initiated a process of public acknowledgement supported by their efforts to review policy and strategy for the fight against poverty, summarized in the Partners in Development report (1969). It was recognized that, given the diversity of national realities, development could not be the same in all countries, although there was acknowledgement of certain commitments that should apply in all cases: social progress, redistribution of wealth, efficient administration, political stability and democratic participation. The evolution of promised amounts and those effectively assigned for development assistance constitutes an essential piece of data in this scenario. In 1969, when performing the evaluation of 20 years of development assistance, the mentioned report had recommended that the official amounts for assistance from donor nations to developing nations should constitute 1% of their respective Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which would include 0.7% of official assistance and the rest for private assistance flows. In October 1970, in resolution 2626 on International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, the General Assembly made a commitment to achieve that objective.

The link established between development and social issues, redistribution and democratic governance was a significant step. The report opened the doors to the gradual inclusion of issues which, until that moment, had been ignored in the Bank’s cooperation programs: the social agenda, the quality of institutions, governance. There was also recognition for the first time that the recipient countries should act as partners of international cooperation. Although it is not possible to refer to a transatlantic dialogue on development cooperation, the space for the issue of the multilateral spheres for international assistance in Washington was convergent with the proposals formulated by the European social-democrat bastions at the time. Although the revision of the cooperation agenda improved the quality of the debate and modified the policies of several donor states, its application faced new obstacles in the 1980s.

The recessive economic conditions in the countries of the North hit Third World countries hard and led to the emergence of governments with strong conservative orientation among the principal donors, which influenced the political orientation of the World Bank. The development agenda became subordinate to the demands for structural adjustment and financial stabilization imposed by the North. From the WB and the IMF appeared the Washington Consensus, a series of fiscal austerity measures and adjustments established by the financial organizations with their base in the U.S. capital. The measures determined the granting of loans, which were conditioned by payment of the foreign debt services, and which became a heavy burden on the
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resources available in the countries in the South, which were forced to contain their fiscal recipes and their budget for social programs. At the same time, the goal that the donors had committed to—elevating their international development assistance to no less than 0.7% of their GDP—was forgotten.

B. Voices of the South and the Search for Development Tools

Within the same context of de-colonization, in different parts of the developing world renowned political and technical leaders expressed criticism and alternative proposals that aimed to reconfigure the system of international economic relations. The list included such names as Nkrumah in Ghana, Nehru in India, later Nyerere in Tanzania, as well as Raúl Prebisch, Oswaldo Sunkel and other Latin Americans. The proposals constituted an important conceptual and political contribution which unsettled the ideological foundations on which international aid had been constructed, based on
reformist expectations of an “overflow” from the industrialized nations of the North to the countries of the South. This led to the formulation of the analytical schemes that attributed underdevelopment mainly to the structural asymmetry of the international system and the form of control exerted by the wealthy nations. In line with this vision, the global production circuit that culminated in the countries of the North and coincided with their strategic interests relegated the non-industrialized countries to a position that did not allow them to overcome their situation of underdevelopment. In addition, great part of the South consisted of economies based on agricultural exports which were subordinate to the unequal conditions of international commerce.

The theoretical readings from, and on, the underdeveloped sectors found their political expression and new proposals for technical instrumentation. The Bandung Conference (1955) had inaugurated a discourse whose aim was the cohesion of the Third World countries, a label used to establish a difference between the First World of the west and the Second World composed of socialist nations. Bandung took on the issue of international economic cooperation (which until then had been in the hands of the western powers) and recommended several measures which aimed to increase the impact of the developing world. The measures presented included the establishment of the Special Fund for Economic Development, which would materialize in 1960, through a greater assignment of resources from the World Bank to the African and Asian countries which would constitute the base for the creation of the United Nations Development Program. There was also a proposal for the creation of an International Finance Corporation and a demand to consult the Afro-Asian nations that participated in international forums in order to promote mutual economic interests.

In the following two decades, the discourse
of the developing countries—marked by the denunciation of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Bretton
Woods system as closed “clubs” that reinforce the asymmetries of the international system—gained global projection and raised awareness in the industrialized countries. 
In the antipodes of the conception of development which was gaining ground in the industrialized countries of the North—based on measurements of growth and improved conditions of per-capita income—were the ideas and proposals which had surfaced in the South, which stated that this was a process of an internal nature. They established that progress could only occur within those countries that carried it out and would depend, not as much on external assistance, but on their own decisions and capabilities. This view took on different formulas, among which was an interpretation of an ethical-political nature formulated by young European social-democrat leaderships which proposed applying new North-South policies for development support. 

The social sciences in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, would seek to offer an analytical framework from which to explain the reality of underdevelopment through the Dependency theory, which identifies and typifies the links between the center and the periphery. The “dependentistas” highlighted the difference between the costs in the labor market in the wealthy countries and the ones in the developing countries and maintained that only a radical change in the system could release them from their condition.

With these precedents, the particular characteristics of Latin America must be underlined when considering the developing world, especially because of the conditionalities imposed by the different colonial legacies. Latin America is part of the first wave of de-colonization, integrating the chain of the processes of formation and consolidation of national states that took place in the 19th century. Apart from constructing a segment of the western world, these countries were not subject to the challenges experienced by the majority of the African and Asian states with regard to combining independence and the establishment of nationality under Cold War conditions. This issue resulted in the fact that the point of identification and the forming of bonds between Latin American countries with the Third World were based more on economic and/or social aspects rather than politics or international security. At the same time, the group of Latin American countries—which remained mainly on the sidelines of the East-West conflict—maintained, since the Second World War, their position in the global system as part of the United States’ area of influence. For the Latin American leaders and thinkers, the identity of the “South” was the result of a political construction rather than a structural condition imposed by the metropolitan powers. Being part of the Third World was always a political decision, whether it was through the Third Way of the Peronist movement of the 1950s, the Brazilian “neutralismo” in the early 60s or the Mexican Third-worldism in the 70s.


21. The Dependency theory took up once again the principle of international division of labor, sustaining that the global economy projected an unequal design which was prejudicial to developing countries which were assigned a secondary role in the production of raw materials with little added value, while the major decisions were made in the central nations in charge of industrial production with high added value. These criticisms of the global system led to national experiences aimed at generating a development process “from the inside”. The objective of the proposals that surfaced in these currents of thought was self-sufficiency through their own means to satisfy national social needs and drive production. For a perspective of the Dependency theory, see: Cardoso, Fernando & Faletto, Enzo Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina, México: Siglo XXI Editores, 1969. Sunkel, Osvaldo, El subdesarrollo latinoamericano y la teoría del desarrollo, México: Siglo XXI, 1973. Amin, Samir, Unequal Development, an Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976.

22. Such was the case of the “African socialism” favored by president Nyerere of Tanzania, based on the ujamaa or extended family which attempted to once again take up the traditional modalities of production putting individual initiative at the service of the community.
The fact that the countries in this region had constructed their nationalities almost 150 years before the former colonies in Africa and Asia helps in comprehending important differences within the “South”.

For most of the African and Asian countries, the reference of the North still calls up the western colonial-imperialist legacy of Europe. This difference did not and does not prevent Latin America from sharing in many of the claims and proposals of the Afro-Asian nations in the international forums once the young independent nations joined them. The Latin American Group (GRULA) was an active segment of the multilateral spaces in the promotion of policies which aimed to revert the situation of commercial disadvantage as was revealed by their participation in the creation of the UNCTAD in the 1960s.23

The fact that the countries in this region had constructed their nationalities almost 150 years before the former colonies in Africa and Asia helps in comprehending important differences within the “South”. Even today, the projection that the old metropolises have over their ex-colonies can still be seen, whether it be through their markets, the cultural or linguistic ties, the migratory flows (as demographic or economic solutions) or the influence that the post-colonial elite have over the world view. The cultural, economic and political presence of the United States in Latin America is already comparable to that which can be found in countries that were of great strategic importance to Washington during the Cold War, such as South Korea, Israel or South Africa.

The asymmetries of international trade were the focal point from which were organized the first demands of the South to modify the development agenda and give substance to the proposals of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77, forums which became the sounding board for the aspirations of the Third World countries.24 At the time of the UNCTAD I (1962) a front of the developing world had been consolidated which, in addition to the African, Asian and Latin American countries, included Yugoslavia, Cyprus and Greece. Pushed forward by the South and resisted by the western countries, the UNCTAD would be institutionalized in 1964 as a permanent organization of the United Nations System. The calling
of the UNCTAD promoted the conformation of the Group of 77, established with a vast majority of African, Asian and Latin American countries and whose almost sole objective was to tackle economic issues. By the group’s initiative, the U.N. General Assembly passed resolution 1897, which was in favor of applying a new international division of labor, with new production and trade guidelines as the only way to strengthen the independence of developing countries. This resolution would serve as the base for the launch of the New International Economic Order, as well as a series of initiatives which include the start of North-South dialogue in 1974 and ambitious cooperation proposals.

The appearance of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the late 1960s could be considered both the cusp and the decline of the construction of the Third World as a unified player in the international debate. From that moment, the situation became more complex and contradictory. As the economic asymmetries and the political differences between the non-industrialized countries grew cooperation weakened. At the same time that the fragmentation within the South was gaining visibility, derived from different insertion capabilities in the markets and the resulting impact in the definition of policies, a more pragmatic view of South-South cooperation was forming. This perspective was encouraged by possibilities of the exchange of technical capabilities between the non-industrialized countries. The conviction concerning the expansion of international cooperation, as well as interdependence, was at the base of the Buenos Aires Plan.

It was within this framework that Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC) gained more importance. It was defined as the exchange of technical and management know-how with the purpose of improving the capabilities of institutions and people in order to promote their own development. TCDC was conceived as a multidimensional process because, although it should have been organized by the governments of the developing countries, it could promote the participation of public organizations and, within the framework of established policies, private organizations and private citizens, as well. There was a proposal for the adoption of innovative technologies that could be adapted to local conditions and needs.


26. El Plan de Buenos Aires (1978) fue el resultado de cinco años de análisis sobre las posibilidades de cooperación técnica entre los países en desarrollo, se proponía introducir cambios en los criterios adoptados para que la asistencia al desarrollo se basara primordialmente en la capacidad nacional y colectiva de los países en vías de industrialización para valerse de medios propios como fundamentos de un nuevo orden económico internacional. No era un planteamiento antagónico, sino una fórmula en la cual confluyan las posiciones de todos los grupos de países. La misma se había construido sobre el proyecto de establecer una verdadera asociación mundial para el desarrollo a la que se incorporarían los países de todas las orientaciones y pertenencias: norte, sur, oriente y occidente.


28. La asistencia de este tipo, sujeta o no a un proyecto de ayuda que incluya transferencia de bienes físicos, abarca una amplia gama de actividades que pueden incluir la asesoría, el otorgamiento de becas, el apoyo institucional, la capacitación, la formación.
C. The Multilateral Construction: The Institutional Territory of North-South Cooperation

The North-South duality is clearly reflected in the architecture of the international organizations linked to economic and social cooperation which operate under the umbrella of the United Nations. The ECOSOC, originally formed by 18 members, grew to its current number of 54, which gave it the legitimacy to echo the demands of the majority. This change, which led to the influx of many Third World countries into the U.N., each with their own proposals, resulted in most of the industrialized states, led by the United States, focusing their efforts and contributions on the Bretton Woods institutions, where the weighted voting (the greater the contribution, the greater the number of votes) allowed them to retain control in the decision-making. As part of the United Nations, these institutions enjoy a high level of autonomy and don’t depend on the contributions of its members for funding as its authorities are key players in the budgeting process. One example was the issuing of concessional credits for the poorest countries, adopted by the WB in 1970 during the presidency of Robert McNamara and which the United Nations had promoted since the 1950s through the Special Fund for Economic Development, which would later become the United Nations Development Program. The same would happen with issues such as the goals of the Development Decade in the 1960s, the proposal on basic necessities in the 70s and the issues of human rights, gender and the construction of peace. See: Jolly, Richard, UN Contributions to Development Thinking and Practice, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.


30. One example was the issuing of concessional credits for the poorest countries, adopted by the WB in 1970 during the presidency of Robert McNamara and which the United Nations had promoted since the 1950s through the Special Fund for Economic Development, which would later become the United Nations Development Program. The same would happen with issues such as the goals of the Development Decade in the 1960s, the proposal on basic necessities in the 70s and the issues of human rights, gender and the construction of peace. See: Jolly, Richard, UN Contributions to Development Thinking and Practice, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.

The social issues –until that time virtually absent from the assistance programs of the large development agencies– had been relegated to the United Nations programs, especially through its specialized organizations and humanitarian programs, such as the World Health Organization and UNICEF with regard to the fight against epidemics and maternal and child nutrition. The incorporation of social needs (and not merely humanitarian emergencies) to development projects, upon consultation with interested governments, had no impact from the recipients’ side. They did not participate in the identification of needs and the formulation of projects and programs. Little by little, the appearance and spread of non-governmental organizations, both in donor and recipient countries, dedicated to humanitarian and development activities, was assimilated as an element that facilitated communication with the assisted population. The concerns regarding local participation and appropriation on the definition of projects and programs were gradually incorporated into the different multilateral spaces.

In the U.N. economic forums, a space more receptive than the Bretton Woods organizations to the issues brought up by the South or by more [self] critical sectors within the same industrialized countries, there had already been a warning concerning the risk
of reducing the concept of development to economic growth\textsuperscript{31}. The UNDP, established in 1964 as a response which was closer to the needs of the Third World, identified technical development assistance as its key element of action. One important consequence was the enrichment of the concept of development by introducing other dimensions such as sustainability, participation, gender and appropriation. The identification of each dimension implied an effort to incorporate technical elements which would allow for the development of strategies, programs and projects and elaborate new methodologies to evaluate impact.

The United Nations adopted several initiatives to deepen the ties between its technical work and the political demands of the South. In 1987, the UNCTAD published its report on Trade and Development, which identified foreign debt as an obstacle to growth in developing countries and advocated condoning it in the cases of those most in debt, a category initially not recognized by the World Bank. UNICEF put into effect the strategy "Adjustment with a Human Face" which underlined the negative impact of the austerity measures imposed by the Washington Consensus on the most vulnerable sectors of the populations of the South: women and children\textsuperscript{32}. For its part, the International Labor Organization (ILO) insisted on the need to address the employment problems, presenting as an objective achieving decent work in contrast to informal and precarious labor and illegal forms of labor exploitation\textsuperscript{33}.

When addressing the multilateral universe of ICD, there must be mention of the specific role of the European Community. For a long period it restricted its actions to a commercial agenda with the independent nations of Africa and Asia, maintaining a policy of non-interference in the colonial ties that 4 of its 6 founding members still maintained. Almost 3 decades after its creation, when the Single European Act (1986) played a "re-foundational" role, development cooperation still seemed to generate a certain amount of susceptibility within the community. It was only after the Maastricht Treaty (1992) that it would be identified as a field for common policy, while the principle of complementarity promoted its harmonization with the actions of the countries in the group that wanted to prioritize the historical ties with their former colonies\textsuperscript{34}. Years later, the principle of coherence was added and then the normative commitment of cooperation policy with a view to the reduction and eradication of poverty in the developing countries.

\textsuperscript{31}. These warning, found in official documents from the beginning of the 1960s, were reflected in a statement by U Thant as Secretary General in 1962: "Development – he said – is not just growth, but growth plus change" See Jolly, Richard, Op Cit


\textsuperscript{34}. See: "Tratado de Maastricht sobre la Unión Europea", Europa: el portal de la Unión Europea. Available online at: http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/maastricht_es.htm [consulted 03/05/2009].
II. NORTH-SOUTH COOPERATION AFTER THE COLD WAR

The end of the bipolar world produces a change in the interests and relations of the North with the South. The new context was interpreted as the definitive and unrestricted triumph of the market economy and the beginning of a period of stability and world peace. Insofar as the Washington Consensus exacerbates the expectations of the industrialized world with regard to the possibility to discipline the South, the margins for freedom and the building of autonomous projects are reduced. Among the expectations of the international community was that it would witness the rise of international assistance, but this time without political conditionalities and strategic calculations. The most optimistic thought that the donors would be able to channel aid through the multilateral mechanisms of the United Nations, without fear of the obstacles imposed by the ideological confrontation. However, there began a new wave of bilateral scenarios: the Europeans (both the EU and individual countries), broadened their actions in their former colonies or in their immediate vicinity, while the United States prioritized strategic points based on the value of their energy resources or the presence of "new threats". In addition, the demand for assistance for humanitarian ends increased considerably, which automatically meant that fewer resources were available for cooperation for mid- and long-term development.

A. The Framework of the New Interventionism

In the first years after the Cold War the guidelines for global politics were reconfigured. The U.N. Security Council began a period of great activism, that later earned the label of "effective multilateralism". In concrete terms, a new concept for international presence was legitimized, which broadened the interventionist agenda of the U.N. There is quickly a second generation of peace operations aimed at dealing with situations of elevated political turbulence within the states. These missions stood out in terms of quantity as well as for the conceptual and practical transformations that they comprised, considering them in this new stage as actions of a multidimensional nature. The numerical expansion and qualitative transformation of the Peace Operations came with the risk that the work for the promotion of development and change in the social conditions of the recipient countries might be left in the background. In fact, the scenarios in many recipient countries became complex and confusing, combining countries that were suffering severe institutional crises and situations of political turbulence and economic collapse with realities where development cooperation was already accomplishing –with more or less positive results- social and production transformations.

The new reality put into evidence the diver-

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36. Between 1945 and 1988 the number of P0s carried out by the UN was 13, while in the period from 1988 to 2006 its number increased to 46. See: Hirst, Mónica "La intervención sudamericana en Haiti" en Hirst, Mónica [comp.] "Crisis del estado e intervención internacional", Buenos Aires: Edhasa, 2009, Pgs. 328-357
As the issue of post-conflict construction of peace on the international cooperation agenda became a task associated with institutional reconstruction, a new generation of international interventions expanded the number of players and functions to be carried out.

The multiple internal armed conflicts, with their devastating consequences for the civilian population, massive forced displacements of people within as well as out of national borders, violations of human rights and humanitarian international law on a large scale, forced a reevaluation of the link between peace, development and human rights. In the middle of the normative transformations of the international community the idea surfaced that the absence of war does not necessarily imply peace, and to ensure it requires actions which eliminate the causes that originate it. These causes contribute to the provocation of intra-state wars: injustice, political exclusion, social and economic exclusion. This conviction was clearly reflected in Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace in 1992.  

In numerous former colonies and in countries in disarray after the fall of the Soviet Union, the disarticulation or dismemberment of the State, its security forces and its institutions by armed factions or secessionist movements caused the collapse of the protection system and the whole range of public goods that normally depended on the State. As the issue of post-conflict construction of peace on the international cooperation agenda became a task associated with institutional reconstruction, a new generation of international interventions expanded the number of players and functions to be carried out. The assistance to countries in transition prioritized several issues that were central in the conflicts: human rights, in particular of those sectors hardest hit by the wars –women, children, ethnic, cultural or other types of minorities– the establishment of institutions in charge of their promoting them and ensuring that they are respected; the reform of the security sector (military and police forces); the establishment of an upright and effective judicial system to prevent impunity; the development of an appropriate institutional and legal framework; the support of political consultation and participation processes, which included the holding of elections; the management of public resources and provision of essential services.
The feedback between turbulent political realities, institutional frailties, recurring conflicts and extreme shortages in different parts of the developing world generated a new wave of assistance actions that once again justified international cooperation. The conceptual and political base that justifies the elaboration of an integrated agenda of “intervention” (peace, development and human rights) was captured in the report released by Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom (2005).

B. The Introduction of the Concept of Human Development

It is also in this context that the agenda of human development is included as a central aspect for development and reduction of poverty. This conceptual expansion ends up stimulating new spheres for coalitions and inter-bureaucratic competition, between the Bretton Woods institutions (particularly the World Bank) and the U.N. agencies.

The integrated view of development, which later becomes a public policy tool in developing countries, had its principal precedent in the formulation of the concept of human development by the UNDP in the early 1990s, first inspired by Mahbub ul Haq, and then with the contributions of Amartya Sen. According to this approach, human development was defined as a process that expanded the choices and capabilities of people, in contrast to development centered on the results of national economic policies that focus their attention on indicators of economic growth as their key element. Three aspects were identified as essential to determine the level of progress: i) the expectation of a long and healthy life; ii) literacy and access to different levels of education; iii) the availability of resources for a decent life. In the instrumental field, the Human Development Index was elaborated, which would allow for the assessment of countries on the basis of more diverse criteria than the traditional ones aimed at measuring growth. The Gender-Related Development Index was also introduced, which applies the same criteria for women, as well as improving the gender situation, and seeks to identify and assess the relative position of this segment in the decision-making processes.


41. Mahbub ul Haq was a prestigious Pakistani economist, a pioneer in the theory of human development and founder of the Human Development Report. His works were the inspiration for the establishment of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Amartya Kumar Sen is a Bengali economist, renowned for his academic research on the theory of human development, the welfare economy and the underlying mechanisms of poverty. He was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1987.

42. The Human Development Index (HDI) is a measuring tool carried out by country which was established by the United Nations Development Program. It is based on a social statistical indicator composed of three parameters: long and healthful life (measured on the basis of life expectancy at birth); education (measured on the basis of adult literacy rate and the combined gross enrollment rate for primary, secondary and higher education, as well as the extent of mandatory education); standard of living (measured in per-capita GDP, PPP in dollars). See: “Composite indices — HDI and beyond”, UNDP. Available online at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/ (consulted 03/11/2009).
The configuration of an agenda of major topics (population, gender, environment, etc.) implied communication between the three key areas of the United Nations System development, human rights and peace and conflict resolution.

Successive reports on human development in the 1990s broadened the agenda by exploring methodological innovations in priority areas, which included: the concept and how to quantify it; the financing of actions aimed at promoting it; human security; equality for women and gender issues; economic growth, poverty, consumption, globalization and human rights. This multi-dimensionality was not meant to be simply an additional aspect of the traditional development theories, but a more in-depth look at the concept of development.43

Human security was conceived in two aspects, expressed as “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”44. The latter considers the State as a necessary agent for the promotion of welfare and is based on the premise that there can be no peace if people are not secure (as opposed to the conception of national security of the State). This view sustains that future conflicts will be the product of social fragmentation, deprivations and disparity. Consequently, human security can be accomplished through development, not firepower. The factors that threaten human security include as much chronic threats like hunger, disease and repression as sudden attacks to daily life, whether it is in the home, the workplace or the community.

The 1994 UNDP report on Human Development lists 7 dimensions that must be protected: the economy, food and nutrition, health, the environment, personal, community and political security. All these elements are added to a “great agenda” for development which, simultaneously, gives it multi-dimensionality and introduces new needs for controls and capabilities for internal and external observation. There are also greater collective expectations with regard to the possibility of there being a global framework of governance capable of monitoring and ensuring North-South commitments. A proliferation of players, networks and forums (non-governmental, inter-governmental, global and national) contribute to the configuration of this process. In this context, the focus of human security has become an organizing element of policies for cooperation on development, public health and security.

But the normative expectation of the Human Development Report of 1999 with regard to the idea that globalization and inclusion could be, and even should be, compatible from the re-foundation of global governance, did not materialize. The impact of liberal policies of structural adjustment, present since the late 1980s, had generated greater adversity for the developing countries, limiting the possibility that the “dissent of New York” could revert the new tendency of decline of social and economic indicators of the Great South. This scenario would present new demands for development cooperation that become part of a global agenda of demands. There are

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two simultaneous processes: the globalization of the winners and that of the losers. In fact, with the “losing” globalization, North-South cooperation from the multilateral sphere gains a richer conceptual arsenal but loses ground to the traditional liberal position defended by the majority of the donor countries.

C. Global Conferences and Millennium Objectives

Undeniably, globalization is becoming a catalyst for multilateralism. In the 90s, some central development issues were once again taken up that had been addressed in previous years, but at that moment were accompanied by an extensive mobilization of sectors from civilian society and international public opinion. Sponsored by the United Nations, which had already been insisting on the need to expand the agenda through major callings, conferences and/or global summits were organized on childhood (New York, 1990), the environment (Río, 1992), human rights (Vienna, 1993), population issues (Cairo, 1994), social issues (Copenhagen, 1995), the advance of women and gender equality (Beijing, 1995), urban development (Istanbul, 1996), and, later, food safety (Rome, 2002)45. The configuration of an agenda of major topics (population, gender, environment, etc.) implied communication between the three key areas of the United Nations System development, human rights and peace and conflict resolution. After the reports on Human Development, the interaction between rights and development leads to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The commitments agreed upon after the meetings in the 1990s cannot be underestimated. However, on topics that directly affect the dominant political leaderships and involve cultural or religious issues (such as those related to women and birth control policies) they had to be diluted as compromises. Even so, these meetings, especially in the preparatory stages, were able to mobilize broad social, political and academic sectors of the North and South around matters that are fundamental in the lives of the societies, bring awareness to global public opinion and exert influence on the governments to make improvements in each of these areas.

45. En Naciones Unidas ya se venía abogando por la introducción de estos temas a la agenda de desarrollo. La preocupación por el medio ambiente y la sustentabilidad de los recursos naturales consta en documentos de los años 60, y en 1972 se llevó a cabo una reunión pionera en Estocolmo en la que se abordaron muchos de los temas después presentes en la agenda de Río-1992. El tema de la mujer había tenido un impulso fuerte a partir de la Convención sobre la Eliminación de todas las Formas de Discriminación contra las Mujeres (CEDAW por su acrónimo en inglés) y la Conferencia de México en 1975. Estos temas fueron retomadas en Beijing-1995.
One effect was to raise awareness with the providers of international cooperation concerning priorities that for a long time had been relegated or seen as the responsibility of the national governments. Another was that it stimulated a greater coordination between the agencies of the United Nations System—often established informally—accompanied by a sense of shared inter-bureaucratic commitment\textsuperscript{46}. New consensuses were generated in order to formulate policies and programs that sought to solidify treaties and agreements on political, civil, economic and cultural rights. These new "packs" of expectations and conditions had a contradictory effect, as in many cases they generated a defensive stance from the developing world.

The differences of the South were in contrast with the uniform discourse of the North—both the official positions and the non-governmental players—which came to validate the notions that seemed hidden within civilization divisions\textsuperscript{47}. The macro-issues of the global conferences allowed for a mosaic of positions and realities to be put on the table\textsuperscript{48}. In the case of the conference in Copenhagen (1994), dedicated to the issue of social development, the weakening of the ideological flags of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism limited the initiative and gathering power of the G-77 and gave way to religious and political differences that adhered the consensuses to the link between development and the protection of human and social rights. These differences became more evident in the conferences dedicated to cultural and ethnic issues, such as the Beijing Conference in 1995 which dealt with women’s rights and the Johannesburg Conference in 2001 which dealt with the struggle against racism and xenophobia.


\textsuperscript{47} Within the intellectual sphere, the construction that resonated the most was the clash of civilizations elaborated by Samuel Huntington, which defends the idea that the world is composed of multiple conflicting civilizations. From his perspective, this is inevitable, as each civilization has a significantly different system of values. See: Huntington, Samuel, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996


From their adoption, the MDGs have been the reference framework within which cooperation activities from the United Nations and the principal agencies for international assistance, both bilateral and multilateral, have taken place.

All in all, the conferences allowed the international community to take note of an ambitious agenda of global issues that expanded the “radar” of cooperation policies. A deeper and more extensive global agenda of commitments was sealed in the year 2000, on the basis of commitments assumed during the previous decade with the United Nations Millennium Declaration. The document, adopted unanimously, set quantitative objectives in eight areas: reduction of poverty, universal education, gender equality, child health, maternal health, the battle against AIDS, sustainability of the environment and the establishment of a global association for development.

From their adoption, the MDGs have been the reference framework within which cooperation activities from the United Nations and the principal agencies for international assistance, both bilateral and multilateral, have taken place. But the Goals have received some criticism, from the political as well as the academic perspective, both in the North and in the South.

The analyses stemming from monitoring the results reveal that the donor countries don’t always distribute the resources for international assistance in a manner cohe with the MDGs. This type of flaw is not necessarily associated with the kind of donor, as it is present both in multilateral organizations and individual states. One specific point, for example, is that the United States and the European Union prefer to assign their cooperation resources to middle-income countries (MICs), in detriment to the poorer countries.

50. To accomplish the goals, 34 numeric goals and 60 progress indicators were defined. The MDGs were quickly adopted as a commitment in a document signed jointly by the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) which make up the primary donors. Subsequently, then-Secretary General Kofi Annan gave economist Jeffrey Sachs the responsibility of running the UN Millennium Project, whose purpose was to develop an Action Plan to support governments in the planning, implementation and evaluation of the agreed-upon goals.


Despite its base weaknesses, the critics agree that the Goals could serve as a catalyst to accomplish a realignment of global development policies.
countries. There is also no serious effort to conceptualize gender empowerment. One difficulty in terms of methodology stems from the diversity of the systems used to quantify results; the established goals can, thus, be distorted by lack of comparable data or by bureaucratic manipulation.

A base issue can be seen in that some critics maintain that despite the declarations of global cooperation, the MDGs are not universal, but simply the reflection of the vision of the North imposed on the South. They tend to consider extreme poverty with a strong welfare-based perspective and ignore their own poverty, for example, among illegal immigrants. They make no reference to inequality, exaggerated wealth or the excesses of a few in detriment to the majority, which characterizes many contemporary societies. Human values are ignored and there is also no reference to social exclusion. According to this view, the commitments of the Millennium have no effect on interests of the countries of the North save with regard to their contributions in official assistance, in many cases conditioned by the return of the lent funds or, like in the case of the United States, by their own strategic interests.

With regard to their application, there have been several proven tendencies. The way that the majority of the countries prefer to fight poverty is through economic growth and social investments, and not policies aimed specifically at the poor; not enough attention is being paid to the struggle against hunger and malnutrition, protection of the environment and access to technology; and more emphasis is being placed on economic governance and the rule of law, and a secondary role is being given to participation in the decision-making process and democratic strengthening. Although the general objectives coincide, there is not always an effort to adapt them to the local conditions and incorporate into the strategic planning. In addition, it is important for the MDGs to include human rights, the promotion of multiculturalism, the struggle against inequality, and for decent work to appear as a goal on its own, and not as a sub-topic under the goal dealing with the fight against poverty.

Despite its base weaknesses, the critics agree that the Goals could serve as a catalyst to accomplish a realignment of global development policies. The promotion of an alliance for development as one of the goals represents the potential for transformation, as it opens up the possibility to tie international cooperation to other policies of the North, whose impact on the countries of the South reaches farther and is usually greater than the very development assistance. This “opening” includes topics such as: international trade, foreign investment, transfer of technology, emigration or asylum and security and defense.

It is in this point, perhaps, where the most hopeful signs might be produced from the perspective of an integrating dialogue that moves in two directions: North-South and South-North. However, the risk that an expanded and inter-communicated agenda might generate new conditionalities should not be underestimated.
III. DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION TODAY

With the MDGs came a new dynamic in North-South cooperation, marked by a sequence of initiatives and proposals. Stepping from the perception that international assistance would be benefited by new consensuses, the community of donors and multilateral organizations came up with the idea of a Big Push. This idea involved combining prominent figures with major causes, which led to the near-simultaneous creation of the UN Millennium Project, coordinated by Jeffrey Sachs –within the framework of the UNDP– and the Commission for Africa, headed by Tony Blair. The new drive in bilateral aid joined the mobilization of the multilateral agencies and myriad non-governmental organizations with multiple and varied development assistance programs.

A. The Context of the Big Push

The process which involves defining policies for international cooperation has become more fluid, especially in the new millennium, with active participation from donors from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), as well as recipient countries. A large group has been formed that includes the providers of assistance, its beneficiaries or partners and the principal international and regional cooperation organizations. There are regular meetings in which the ministers responsible for promotion or development, from donor and recipient governments, together with the principal multilateral cooperation agencies, discuss assistance policies and programs in order to agree on criteria, identify problems and define future actions. This process was intensified as a result of the Monterrey Consensus (2002), in which it was acknowledged that official development assistance amounts were far below what was considered necessary in order to achieve the MDGs. In Monterrey, a work group was formed to
analyze the efficiency of aid and to propose measures to increase it\textsuperscript{59}. A significant milestone in this effort was the meeting held in Paris in March of 2005, whose Final Declaration underlines the concurrence between the donors and recipients in a series of agreements aimed at reforming the supply and management of international cooperation\textsuperscript{60}.

According to these agreements, the donors made a commitment to harmonize their assistance flows, to make them more complementary to avoid doubling, adopt a common outlook for environmental evaluations and synchronize humanitarian aid and development assistance. They also agreed to align assistance with national development strategies and the priorities of the recipient countries, who also agree to take on actions in order to strengthen their own institutional and management capabilities, which include public finance, with guidance from the donors. An important consequence of the Big Push was to reinforce the consensus regarding the expectations of the donors, which also gave them greater possibilities to put pressure on the recipients.

By adopting the principle of mutual responsibility, both sides are obligated to apply criteria for transparency and accountability toward their own citizens and parliaments. The donors recognize the need to assume commitments for assistance which are quantifiable, predictable and multi-annual, and agree to delegate greater power to managers in the field and to use national capabilities (institutional and in terms of personnel) whenever possible, in line with the general objective of promoting a development process which is sustainable. Another commitment was made to remove commercial or other forms of conditionalties from assistance efforts, which, as mentioned before, corresponded with policies adopted by some donors (the Nordic countries, Holland, the United Kingdom). Different regulations are aimed at assisting fragile states, and goals and implementation timetables are established, as well as progress indicators.

The commitments agreed upon in Paris warranted meetings for supervision and periodical review. The most recent one took place in Accra, Ghana, in September of 2008, under the slogan “Agenda for Action”. The agreements imply a significant change in international cooperation policies in the countries of the North; on the one hand, by involving the recipients of aid as partners in the process, and on the other by expanding expectations concerning the capabilities of the South to deal with assistance in a context of changes which involves democracy, economic growth, social progress and protection of the environment.

In the universe of governmental donors (the first pillar of international cooperation), there have appeared cracks with regard to the characteristics and reach of cooperation. Where some see it as a way to introduce an action model that promotes progress through competition and the open market, others view it as a responsibility that first must see to the more pressing social needs, in order to facilitate the growth of low-income countries according to the specific characteristics of each one. The aim is to project the welfare state of the countries of the North promoting a participatory approach in international cooperation.

\textsuperscript{59} The Monterrey Consensus was the result of the International Conference on Financing for Development, held on March 18th to the 22nd of 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico, under the auspices of the United Nations. Participants included member countries, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and private players.

\textsuperscript{60} The Paris Declaration was the result of the High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness for Development held on March 2nd, 2005 in France. Participants included ministers from developed countries and directors from international development organizations.
The World Bank maintained its role in the group of multilateral assistance organizations (the second pillar of IC). It was joined by the regional inter-governmental organizations and banks, the European Union standing out among them. Coordination, coherence and efficiency in assistance policies become the main concerns among the donors.

Although 80% of the resources allocated to ICD come from entities from the donor countries and the World Bank, the different U.N. agencies allocate an average of 5 trillion dollars a year through support programs, added to a wide variety of political and technical assistance in the areas of health, education, natural resources, sanitary conditions, social and demographic integration and infrastructure. Demands are also being addressed in the fields of agriculture, industry and services, with relation to every economic dimension (trade, investment, etc.). This group of activities is channeled through three basic fields of action:

1. development objectives through assistance in development policy management;
2. financial and technical assistance;
3. support in the monitoring and evaluation of results which prioritizes a specialized and interdisciplinary approach.

The DAC, which operates within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with participation from 24 donor countries and the European Commission, has redoubled its efforts to bring cohesion to international assistance through various initiatives. The DAC maintains a compilation of data on development funds offered by the donors which includes information on every industrialized country, measured in percentage of their GDP (see Graph 1, Annex 1).

These numbers on international cooperation show that, although there have been quantitative advances in this field, these can
mainly be attributed to the incorporation of new donors whose economies have experienced significant rates of growth (as is the case with Spain and Ireland). In fact, the flow of aid plateaued after a growth period that began in 1997, and only five countries (Denmark, Holland, Luxemburg, Norway and Sweden) meet the agreed upon requirement of assigning international assistance at a level of 0.7% of their GDP. The percentage of aid reached an average of only 0.22% of the GDP, increasing to 0.33% in 2005, far below the goal established in 1970 by the United Nations General Assembly.

When analyzing the target of cooperation and its link to the universe of private interests, a difference can be seen between assistance directed at improving the conditions of the individual, related to the liberal ideal—which directs the actions of USAID—and that committed to collective economic and social progress, as is the case with the Nordic countries, whose actions prioritize the reduction of poverty.

At the same time, it can be seen that, with the exception of the Nordic countries, there is a marked preference for channeling aid through bilateral mechanisms instead of multilateral ones. The most common reasons given for this tendency are the slowness of the bureaucratic processes of the international organizations and the high costs that are added to the distribution of funds. Despite the fact that measures have been implemented to attenuate these difficulties, it has not been enough to revert the preference for bilateral assistance. For the countries providing assistance, the use of their own cooperation agencies provides advantages and political guarantees on the domestic front, apart from constituting a source of prestige and international projection.

In fact, one of the points highlighted by the literature on the donation culture of the North is its commitment to the political and institutional contexts and the interests of their respective governments. In other words, it is an effective soft variable of power. Tied cooperation can respond to three types of motivations: i) economic ones, related to investment and trade; ii) political ones, linked to positions on foreign policy or positions adopted in multilateral spheres; iii) strategic ones, which function as an element used to barter for military support and/or are explained by the location of recipient countries in areas of influence.

Cooperation is less frequently tied to inter-

“...a difference can be seen between assistance directed at improving the conditions of the individual, related to the liberal ideal—which directs the actions of USAID—and that committed to collective economic and social progress, as is the case with the Nordic countries, whose actions prioritize the reduction of poverty...”

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61. This categorization can be found in the work of Manuel Iglesia-Caruncho. See: Iglesia-Caruncho, Manuel, El impacto económico y social de la cooperación para el desarrollo, Madrid: Libros de la Catarata, 2005
est groups in those countries where internal monitoring is more effective and mechanisms for the prevention of corruption are more rigorous\(^\text{62}\). International assistance is considered a global public good, with growing support from social players that hold more deep-rooted democratic values.

There is also a difference in resources which come from official sources and those from private foundations, which naturally affects the degree of political commitment from the citizenship toward these initiatives. In countries like Japan and the United States, for example, the importance of official assistance is noticeably inferior to that from private entities.

The fact that the Scandinavian countries do not have a legacy of colonialism contributed to reducing the strategic sense of their respective cooperation policies. Another factor which favors action with fewer ties to the business world is the predominance of social-democratic governments in this part of Europe. Although these countries represent a minor portion with regard to the total numbers related to international assistance, they hold an important place when it comes to the relation between the resources they earmark toward international assistance and their respective domestic products. Of the four members of the OECD that normally far surpass the commitment of 0.7%, 3 are of Nordic origin (Denmark, Norway and Sweden)\(^\text{63}\). With the exception of Sweden, most of the resources are channeled through NGOs and with the exception of Denmark, the transfers are generally not related to economic or commercial cooperation, but rather aimed at social programs (mostly in the area of health) and administrative infrastructure. In the correlation between international assistance and political profile, it is more common to find a positive correlation between donors and recipients when dealing with human rights and democratic governance rather than international politics\(^\text{64}\).

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The Commitment to Development Index – published since 2003 by the Center for Global Development – establishes seven indicators that measure the policies implemented in the fields of assistance, trade, investment, migration, the environment, security and technology (see Graph 2, Annex 1). A certain continuity can be observed, in the last five-year period, in the countries better positioned as donors; even more important is to cross-reference the ranking with the attributes, which allows for the visualization of the substance of the bilateral dynamic (see Graph 2, Annex 1). The position of the United States in 2008 can be explained by the resources allotted to policies on security, immigration and trade. The increase, in absolute terms, of the international cooperation resources in the 2000–2007 period went to Iraq and Afghanistan, and for their programs in the fight against HIV-AIDS, and a significant reduction in their support of development and social programs in other parts of the world. Spain shows a balance between its budget for international assistance and immigration issues. Canada’s position is surprising, with an important proportion of resources in the area of security, while maintaining a fairly balanced distribution among the other indicators. Two cases are particularly striking: the Netherlands, for having the most equitable distribution across all the attributes, and Ireland, considering the importance it gives to its policies of direct assistance. In the countries of the North, the context of the Big Push led to new modalities for initiatives in the field of development cooperation.

With the aim of reducing transaction costs and improving results, the Nordic Plus group has been experimenting with what it calls delegated cooperation (see Graph 6, Annex 1). In this case, one country assumes the role of “lead donor” and another that of “delegating” donor or “silent partner” in the coordination of specific programs, which results in different forms of agreements between northern countries which vary depending on individual norms. In this case, the point that needs to be underlined is the difference between delegated and triangular, which implies the presence of a southern country and another type of understanding from the North.

Within the sphere of donors the notion of “good practices” is gaining relevance, which implies introducing different mechanisms for accountability which aim to improve the control of resources and the results of the actions undertaken. Although it is correct to affirm that in this way there is a transfer of a series of controls that are already being applied in other fields which involve the utilization of public resources, it is also worth noting that these actions also imply the expansion of monitoring of international aid at its destination. The preoccupation regarding the appropriation on the part of the recipients opened up a space for their participation in the supervision and control of the resources they receive through their own instruments. In political terms, the challenge of the utilization of “best practices” lies in maintaining the criteria for accountability and for determination of the most appropriate and necessary implementation of assistance activities. Naturally, the diversity of the dynamics between donors and recipients tends to grow, which shows the difficulty of institutionalizing norms which cover a wide spectrum that prioritize compatible monitoring methods.

As a group, the studies on international assistance policy try to achieve a common goal: evaluate its transformative impact on...
social and institutional conditions of the recipient countries. There is a prevailing view that the vices outweigh the virtues, whether because of the faults of one side or the other. Two types of approaches fuel critical reflection concerning the results of North-South cooperation: one is of a technical nature, accompanied by econometric models that measure its results, simulate scenarios and propose new formulas for combining the supply and demand of assistance; the other has a more anthropological and culturalistic approach. In this case, many times a sarcastic tone is adopted which condemns international aid to failure due to reiterated mistakes which are still repeated from the colonial practices of the 19th century. North-South cooperation would correspond with a "white man’s burden” offered bilaterally and multilaterally and marked by a list of faults and frustrations. Among these, the following “sins” stand out:

1. Impatience (with institution building),
2. Envy (collusion and coordination failure);
3. Ignorance (failure to evaluate);
4. Pride (failure to exit);
5. Sloth (pretending participation is sufficient for ownership);
6. Greed (unreliable as well as stingy transfers);
7. Foolishness (underfunding of global and regional public goods).

The criticisms of the welfare formulas also include warnings concerning the risks of the simplifying typologies applied to the recipients. They affirm that the greater the fragility of the reality to be attended, the more important it is to consider its specific characteristics. The absence or precariousness of institutional resources is caused by the very process of external support which, at the same time, can only be effective when executed in a coordinated fashion by the entire community of donors. Certain skepticism prevails that this coordination can overcome the individual strategic, economic and political motivations of the donor countries. How to ensure that international cooperation can deal with overlapping or negligence becomes its principal challenge.
In March the Commission presented its proposal for an “EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labor in Development Policy” which establishes 11 guiding principles: (1) concentrate activities in-country on focal sectors; (2) reorganize their other activities in-country; (3) promote a primary-donor agreement for each focal sector; (4) promote delegated cooperation or association agreements; (5) guarantee adequate support in the strategic sectors; (6) repeat the practice of division of labor on a regional scale; (7) designate a limited number of priority countries; (8) give adequate financing to those countries neglected with regard to aid; (9) analyze and expand the areas of competence; (10) pursue progress in other aspects of complementarity; (11) expand reforms in the aid systems. See: Portal de la Unión Europea, “Código de conducta sobre la complementariedad y la división del trabajo en la política de desarrollo”. Available online at: http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/es/lvb/r13003.htm (consulted 01/14/2009).

One essential characteristic of this type of cooperation is its natural inclination to find receptive counterparts in their own image.

B. The European Union and its New Modalities

In the last five-year period the EU became a first-line player in the community of donors as a source of support for development. The resources used to that end went from 37 billion 109.39 million to 61 billion 540.35 million dollars, an increase of 65.83\%\(^71\). New guiding principles and a tailor-made institutional framework were incorporated in an attempt to improve results, endow the actions with a greater sense of community and reduce the problems of overlapping and erraticism. The result was the elaboration of a Development Cooperation Instrument and later a Code of Conduct, accompanied by new, specially-designed financial and support instruments\(^72\).

The community budget projected for the 2007-2013 period is 16.9 million euros, distributed on the basis of topic and geography\(^73\). The volume of resources earmarked for food security (10.1\%) and the NGOs (9.7\%) is striking, in contrast to those to be used, for example, for migration issues (2.3\%). Another point to highlight is the place occupied by Asia (30.7\%) –differentiated from Central Asia– followed by Latin America (15.9\%)\(^74\).

Within the sphere of action carried out by the EU, decentralized cooperation (DC) began to gain relevance, offered by a group of regions and European localities (sub-national governments) that formulate their own external agendas. In countries such as Spain, France, Italy and Germany, local governments are responsible for significant portions of the resources that support development in different parts of the world\(^75\). This form of assistance is a long-term consequence of the contributions of regional funds, which in the 1970s and 80s allowed for a more equitable distribution of community resources. Within its same context, the presence of civilian organizations became more notable in the management of public policy in Europe.

One essential characteristic of this type of
cooperation is its natural inclination to find receptive counterparts in their own image, that is, to find as a destination provincial and municipal governments and/or organizations that represent local interests and demands\(^\text{75}\). The predominant idea is that there is less risk of a political deviation of action and more commitment to the citizens. In Latin America, there is a positive correlation between the expansion of DC and a greater presence on the part of participative public management at the provincial and municipal levels\(^\text{76}\). If on the side of the donor, DC is the product of a growing margin of political and economic autonomy of the regional administrations, on the side of the recipient we find a political voice and administrative management capabilities of the local governments accomplished due to the strengthening of democratic processes. From a global perspective, it is said that the MDGs stimulate DC, as they promote the involvement of local authorities and players in achieving them.

Due to the fact that this is an innovative form of action, with a strong “altruistic” component, DC causes less concern as far as its efficiency vis-à-vis other cooperation modalities. The simple fact that this type of assistance escapes the control of the national governments, both from the donor and recipient sides, and that its attributes are related to more “invertebrate” institutional spheres, makes monitoring difficult. There are some advantages to DC, similar to those mentioned concerning delegated cooperation, as far as transaction costs, and the interaction between donors and recipients involves less bureaucratic demands and norms than the classic bilateral cooperation. Paradoxically, this is an easier path to the strengthening of the recipient and co-responsibility, which replaces the idea of assistance with that of complementary action, held in high regard especially after the Paris Declaration.

\(^{75}\) The European Commission defines DC as an association formula that involves a great variety of players – provincial and regional governments, NGOs, chambers of commerce and industry, community-based organizations, universities, unions and companies – responsible for international assistance actions with social, political and economic objectives. See: Abraham, Leonardo Díaz, La Cooperación Oficial Descentralizada, Madrid: Libros de la Catarata, 2008.

\(^{76}\) It is interesting to note that the European context is not the only one which promotes DC. Quebec, for example, in its role as an autonomous government, has been offering this sort of assistance for 100 years. See: Quebec Ministry of International Relations, Quebec’s International Policy: Working in Concert. Available online at: http://www.mri.gouv.qc.ca/en/pdf/Sommaire.pdf

\(^{77}\) See: Observatorio de la Cooperación Descentralizada, “La Cooperación Descentralizada”. Available online at: http://www.observ-ocd.org/QueEs.asp (consulted 03/02/2009).
While DC presents positive aspects, it simultaneously introduces new problems, of dispersion, overlapping and difficulties in systematizing information. In addition, for those countries that seek to broaden their influence in the definition of global norms for international development cooperation, the decentralized format could weaken their position both at the national and regional levels. Classified as an action of “paradiplomacy”, the term “Decentralized Cooperation” has been the subject of controversy and conceptual confusion with regard to the spectrum of inter-institutional and non-institutional ties that it can encompass78. In the political plane, the federal government organizations, especially the foreign ministries, question the management and decision-making capabilities of the local governments in their countries to deal with this type of assistance.

The EU is the most favorable territory for conceptualization and experimentation of DC, as it becomes more and more utilized and it is articulated with the community process, especially with the facet of subsidiarity79. The cooperation offered by the sub-national governments coincides with the increasingly more dynamic nature of regional external policy. In Spain, where these funds are 15% of the total budget for international cooperation, the principal destination for this type of aid is still the low-income countries in Latin America, who in 2004 absorbed over 55% of their actions linked to services and social infrastructure80.

79. A chronological evolution of the mechanism created by the EU for DC can be found in: Abraham, Leonardo Díaz, Op. Cit.
80. In 2004 the Observatory of Decentralized Cooperation UE-AL was created as a reference center for the analysis of local decentralized cooperation between both regions. See also: Cezário, Gustavo, Andrade, Marinana, "A cooperação descentralizada no Brasil", 2008. Pgs. 5-6, mimeo.
C. The Non-Governmental Players

In parallel to the official process, there has been a mobilization of non-governmental organizations from the North and South (the third pillar) dedicated to the topic of cooperation. They have established a wide network of links and have gained importance in their role to mobilize public opinion, promote complementary proposals or alternatives, obtain funds or execute programs and projects, in many cases paid for by official national or intergovernmental organizations. In absolute terms there was a notable expansion in the resources earmarked for cooperation and humanitarian assistance handled by the NGOs in recent decades. Joining the NGOs, the private foundations became key players in the financing of programs for health, housing, infrastructure and community undertakings.

On the side of the offerers of international cooperation, a varied configuration of public-private collaboration gained visibility, stimulated by the growing presence of large companies and individual funds, especially originated in the United States, in assistance programs and the offer of international public goods. There are two generations of philanthropic entities in the community of donors: the first appears in the 1960s, linked to large corporations and/or personal fortunes, with social and educational programs in Asia, Africa and Latin America, which in some cases work in association with multilateral agencies. The second emerges in the 90s, as a corollary of financial globalization and the growth in the sectors of communication and information technology. Despite the fact that it weighs less in absolute terms, this presence widens the radius of action of the private sector in international cooperation, which had previously been camouflaged in the “hidden agendas” of the donor countries. The philanthropic entities and corporations many


82. Between 1980 and 2003 the aid from the members of the OECD distributed through NGOs increased from 47 million dollars to 4 trillion dollars. According to estimations by the UNDP there are approximately 37,000 international NGOs acting in different fields of assistance. See: Glasser, Robert, “Why We Need to Look Hard at the NGOs Flaws”, Europe’s World, Spring 2008

The domestic support indicators for these initiatives reveals that they have become a factor that can both stimulate or inhibit the North’s commitment to international cooperation.

84. Notable examples of the first generation were the Rockefeller, Mac Arthur, Mott and Carnegie Foundations. One striking example of a private-multilateral association was the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which has ties to the UNDP and promotes family planning. In the following generations the philanthropic experiences of George Soros, Ted Turner and Bill Gates can be highlighted. The first created the Open Society Institute which focuses its efforts in promoting governance and public health in Eastern Europe; the second commits his resources to the UN Foundation especially focused on issues of reproductive health, the environment and conflict prevention; the third is responsible for the resources of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation for the support of health programs, particularly in the field of widespread vaccination. Among the private foundations which are visible with regard to international assistance are the Hewlett Foundation and the David & Lucile Packard Foundation. See: Kimble, Melinda, “Can Partnerships Between International Organizations and Private Foundations Provide Public Goods?”, World Bank Partnership Conference. Available online at: http://www.worldbank.org/html/oed/partnershipconference/images/melinda-kimble.pdf

85. One of the many examples of this combination between private initiative, humanitarian aid and media repercussion is the Jolli-Fitt Foundation which allocates funds for the fight against HIV in Ethiopia, the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, education for Iraqi children and the reconstruction of New Orleans.

nizations many times steer their actions in the South according to their international positions. The contradictions also appear in the actions of NGOs as operational arms of the governments of the South. In countries that face chronic institutional deficits and whose international assistance had been conditioned to this type of coordination, what initially seemed to be a solution could be the source of a host of new problems. In this way, the advantageous apolitical action of the NGOs could end up binding cooperation in one or in both ends of the programs and projects that are executed.

The matter of efficiency of assistance has garnered a lot of attention with respect to the results of these organizations, which does not necessarily imply improved capabilities to attend to the demands of the recipients. The fact that in many cases these organizations act in such diverse fronts (environmental disasters, emergence of conflicts, development programs), which implies very-short-term, short-term, mid-term and eventually long-term actions, makes it difficult to apply adequate mechanisms of evaluation that could lead to learning processes and overcoming previous errors. In addition, the evaluations that are carried out almost always respond to criticisms which are political, technical, or economic of the societies and governments of the North, which generates a vicious cycle which is hard to break.
D. The Context of the Crisis and the Need to Expand the Circle of IC

As was underlined in different sections of this document, **North-South cooperation for development has always been conditioned by the international context.** The global dimension of the current crisis generates new shortages and restrictions with a strong impact on the community of donors. At the conference in Doha (December, 2008) the predictions concerning the conditions for financing ICD in the near future were bleak. The meeting was dominated by a pessimism regarding the possibility of reaching the goals established in the Monterrey Consensus in a scenario charged with adverse factors, such as: food insecurity, the volatility of the prices of commodities and energy resources, the impasse in international trade negotiations, the persistent global financial crisis and the broken confidence in the global economic system. More striking due to its participatory tone rather than the political weight of the participants, at the Doha Conference there was no resignation with respect to the commitment toward the goal of 0.7% by 2015. The final declaration at the meeting paved the way for a series of consultations and meetings with the aim of achieving regulatory and institutional reforms, in addition to calling for a new meeting of the same kind for 2013.

In the present-day, there is little clarity regarding the short- and mid-term horizons of North-South cooperation. From a positive perspective, it was observed in Doha that the volume of international assistance has grown by 40% after Monterrey, even though most of it is related to humanitarian aid and condoning of debt. Among the predictions of the World Economics Situation and Prospects Report of 2009, released by the United Nations High-Level Panel, it says that the drop in GDPs could be favorable for accomplishing the percent goals for international assistance established by the ODA. However, prior recessive situations would seem to indicate another horizon: during the recession of 1972/73 global aid fell 15%, while in a similar situation in the 1990/93 period, it dropped 25% (and the volume from 1992 was only regained in 2003); and between 1992 y 1997 the ODA of the donors from the DAC went from 0.33% to 0.22% of their GDP.

A schedule full of international conferences in 2008, promoted by the community of donors, took on the objective of improving the results of the new consensuses. In every case there was acknowledgement that the advances achieved were and will be insufficient to accomplish the goals previously agreed upon, which necessitates the creation of new strategies. The need for inclusive dynamics with active partners was marked as the desired path, which invol-

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92. The Follow-up International Conference on Financing for Development in charge of examining the implementation of the Monterrey Consensus took place from 11/29 to 12/02 of 2008 in Doha, Qatar. Representatives from over 160 countries participated, including over 40 Heads of State or Government and the "Doha Declaration" was adopted by consensus. It underlines the need for fiscal reform and highlights the need for industrialized nations to fulfill the goal of committing 0.7% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to development assistance.
ves "developing players" like the middle-income countries (especially those labeled as "emerging donors"), the global funds, the private sector and the NGOs. The importance of coordination between all of them, in order to avoid overlapping and allow for a division of duties under the full appropriation and leadership of the recipient, is underlined as a short-term challenge in development assistance.

Although the possibilities to improve the performance of the North seem infinite, it is still noteworthy that the elaborated proposals don’t contemplate the building of a political dialogue on IC with the South. This need becomes more pressing as the North’s actions in the South become more fragmented. Apart from there being different actions for middle-income and low-income countries, there is a tendency toward certain preferences that end up establishing a group of countries which is more beloved (labeled "donor darlings") and another which is relegated to secondary status (aid orphans).

It is worth dedicating some lines now to the specific topic of middle-income countries, South-South cooperation and the recent value being given to triangular cooperation. The mention of South-South cooperation by the community of donors is done as if it were a complementary dimension of ICD. It is also noteworthy that civilian organizations are being given the same status as MICs, as "independent development players".

The argument that the MICs can and should broaden their activity as a source of cooperation for the LICs acquired relevance recently in the global spheres. However, the new postulates of IC have not yet been absorbed by many developing countries and warrant a deeper discussion in the different regions. In Latin America, countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and

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93. A recent categorization of South-South cooperation identifies 18 countries of the South that provide development assistance, which can be sub-divided into 2 groups based on the volume of their contributions to cooperation. The main group comprises: Brazil, China, India, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the Republic of Korea, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. The secondary group is formed by: Argentina, Chile, Egypt, Israel, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Tunisia. See: United Nations Economic and Social Council, "Trends in South-South and triangular development cooperation", Background study for the Development Cooperation Forum, April 2008

México, which are more and more committed to South-South cooperation, could make important contributions, as much at the conceptual level as in the concrete field of technical cooperation, based on their own experiences and learning. The definition of strategies for aid starting with the identification of the MICs aims to introduce a differential approach for the North and within the South. It is a more benevolent concept than that of “graduation”, but that also brings with it the idea of “it is now time”, maintaining that IC should be two-way for this category of countries.

As the MICs expand their aptitudes as donors, there is more interest on the part of the HICs to develop triangular cooperation projects\textsuperscript{95}. Pero se torna difícil escapar de los campos de interés previamente definidos por estos países -el poder de la agenda-, lo cual implica la imposición de ciertos condicionantes para el montaje de sus asociaciones con los PRMs. Este tipo de cooperación casi siempre combina recursos de los PRAs con la experiencia de los PRMs, dado que se pretende “aprovechar” el conocimiento y sensibilidad del Sur para maximizar resultados. También se pretende capitalizar ventajas tales como afinidades culturales (inclusive lingüísticas) y políticas, así como el contacto directo y cotidiano con la exclusión social que los países en desarrollo comparten.

In fact, triangular cooperation still has to find its place in the global architecture of development cooperation\textsuperscript{96}. It is a modality of International Cooperation which began in the 1980s and 90s through the offer of technicians and specialists to assemble development assistance programs carried out by the MICs in the LICs. Currently, the goal is to expand the economic commitment and institutional development of new donors, which creates expectation with regard to their political role in defining the agenda for triangular IC. Its expansion could contribute to the differentiation of donor pro-

\textsuperscript{95} Among the “liquid” donor countries interested in triangular cooperation, Japan (Japan International Cooperation Agency-JICA), Germany (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit-GTZ) and the United Kingdom (Department for International Development-DFID) are the ones that stand out. See: United Nations Economic and Social Council, Ídem.

\textsuperscript{96} See: United Nations Economic and Social Council, Ídem. Pgs. 14-17
When triangulation involves multilateral organizations, the possibilities increase to design projects which are less “contaminated” by the asymmetries of the international order.

files among the developing countries and high-income countries. When triangulation involves multilateral organizations, the possibilities increase to design projects which are less "contaminated" by the asymmetries of the international order. This constitutes a challenge for the southern countries, which in the years to come must manage to influence the processes of global institutional restructuring and redefinition of the mandates of the multilateral agencies.

According to the IMF report The Implications of the Global Financial Crisis for Low-Income Countries (March, 2009), the global financial crisis will have a considerable impact on the LICs, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa. It states that the LICs are more exposed to this crisis than previous ones because they are more inserted in the global economy through trade, direct foreign investment and remittances. Above all, the impact of the crisis will be felt in the reduction of exports and the price of raw materials. In consequence, the budgets of the LICs will be affected due to the fact that many of them will have to increase their spending on social policies and this additional pressure could generate a currency depreciation and increase interest rates, which, at the same time, increases foreign debt. Thus, the possibility of managing the crisis through anticyclical policies depends a lot on the support of donor nations. The projection is that the financial needs of the LICs will increase by at least 25 trillion dollars in 2009, although this number could go as high as 140 trillion if the worst-case projections materialize, which means that they will need external assistance and additional international financing.

Among the many consequences that could emerge from the current context of global financial crisis is the possibility that it could stimulate new North-South and South-South consensuses related to international cooperation. As the creative side of an adverse state of affairs this would be a favorable situation to broaden responsibilities and define new roles, as much for the multilateral organizations, the donors (from the North and South) and the non-governmental players committed to development cooperation. The G-20 meetings could be a space that can be used to such ends, but dialogue and political coordination in this process are crucial, as the agendas for international trade, global finance and support for development and democratic governance have moved “dangerously” close.

IV. FINAL REFLECTIONS

This document aims to cover the vast and complex territory of North-South development cooperation. Although its different dimensions and issues were not exhaustively addressed, the attempt was to contemplate those points which, yesterday and today, have most influenced its configuration. In the present-day, it is more and more difficult to differentiate North-South development cooperation from humanitarian aid and security cooperation. The work sought to address primarily the classic cooperation agenda, while still including its "post-modern" manifestations, such as DC.

Although it might seem obvious to mention it, it is important to be clear on the fact that cooperation is only one of the many components that make up North-South relations. In this sense, some re-interpretations which were considered inappropriate in dealing with North-South cooperation were not taken into account, such as those that identify the remittances from immigrant workers to their home countries or the condoning the foreign debt of the LICs as modalities of international assistance. In the first case, there cannot be a dissociation of the presence of unqualified migrant labor from the grouping of structural inequalities that determine the center-periphery dynamic. In addition, this presence corresponds with a group of economic and social factors that benefits the growth indexes of these countries. The financial remittances that take place from the industrialized countries by the immigrant workers of the South should not be calculated as "privatized assistance". This particularly controversial interpretation could open up a new field to politicize North-South relations which, apart from involving the topic of IC, includes the delicate issue of immigration. With regard to condoning the foreign debt of the LICs, this occurs after many years of South-North financial transfers for the alleviation of interests and/or the principal amount, in addition to the subordination of the debtors to conditionalities which were often harmful to their economies. Therefore, this vision corresponds with a distorted understanding of the situation, with negative effects for ICD.

Whether it is looking back or observing the present, North-South development cooperation, while revealing the capacity for transformation concerning the variety of the technical instruments, the diversity of the players involved and the innovations with regard to norms, seems to suffer from chronic and insurmountable flaws with regard to obtaining results which are equally satisfying for donors and recipients. Despite the existence of endless strategy memos, reports and technical articles pointing out imperfections and suggesting new instruments and methodologies, the essence of the matter seems to rest more on the political aspect. It is worth examining if the
combination of the Big Push from the North together with new configurations of cooperation in and with the South—including the presence of an acting group of donors—could pave the way for a “reinvention” of dialogue between the two sides. The impact of the global financial crisis could present itself as an opportunity to advance in this direction, there will have to be an understanding that it will be very difficult for the Big Push to translate to big results.

Following is a list of some final considerations that attempt to link the past with the present of North-South cooperation, in addition to presenting some ideas that could be useful for its future.

1. The international cooperation map has changed substantially. After the rehabilitation of Germany, Italy and Japan, the incorporation of new countries to the process of European integration and the possession of strategic resources for the global market there were many factors that drove economic growth and modernization in countries which today have joined the universe of donors.

The view of development had to be modified due to the speed of the changes and in light of the needs, not only of the countries of the South, but also as a consequence of an expanded international agenda which demands attending to issues that previously had been avoided: preserving the environment, the role of women, the needs of children and the rights of ethnic, cultural or religious minorities. The conception of the cooperation processes has also changed. It went from being seen as a stream going from North to South, to a highway with multiple lanes going back and forth and in different directions. It is also acknowledged that it is indispensable to incorporate in the different stages of cooperation both donors and recipients as primary partners, and to also include other interested parties: parliaments, the beneficiary populations and third-party or non-governmental organizations from the North and South, if the assistance efforts are to be successful. Permanent dialogue between these players enriches the process of definition of policies, as well as the design, execution and evaluation of the cooperation programs and projects. However, the risk of fragmentation and dispersion also increases.

2. The debate on IC in the international community acquired a density which accompanies the evolution and new complexities of the global agenda. In the last 10 or 15 years, some original approaches have surfaced, systematized in the Paris Declaration of 2005, regarding the responsibilities, the distribution of economic resources, the government authority and responsibilities, the role of multilateral and civilian organizations, and, perhaps most importantly, the complexity of the realities to be addressed through these means. The formulation of the MDGs, besides addressing what is now termed the universe of “multidimensional poverty”, established a new framework of expectations for IC.

The international scenario has been stimulating alternative perceptions and strategies for action to deal with the global social agenda, focused on the need to combat or alleviate the more dramatic manifestations of the shortages in the LICs. There was a greater acknowledgement of the need to ensure universal and mandatory mid-term actions from the countries of the North.
The configuration of new principles for North-South cooperation (appropriation, alignment, harmonization, results management and mutual accountability) were ratified in the last three-year period by the community of donors in different international forums dedicated to this topic. Parallel to this process, the academic and technical literature on North-South cooperation has expanded its capabilities, offering conceptual, methodological and policy innovations.

3. The new notion that a segment of the South represents a new class of donors has several implications. One of them would be that the club of bilateral donors recognizes a grouping of developing countries -highlighting the BRICs- as new partners in international cooperation. However, the conditions for constructing this dialogue are not yet finished. The recent meetings (and preparatory meetings) of the G-20 illustrate the closed and self-referenced character of the members of this club, which does not constitute a facilitating starting point.

For the North, the ICD is not seen, and never has been, as an instrument for correcting the structural imbalances concerning the distribution of resources in the international system. All the movements in favor of increasing and improving the activity of the community of donors is established based on the value given to altruistic policies which in no way resemble the arguments of structuralist thought of the 1950s and 60s, for which cooperation could contribute to reducing the “savings gap” of the developing world.

4. Throughout the years, there were many expectations that were lost along the way with regard to North-South cooperation, among them, the creation of functional ties of South-South cooperation as an essential tool, fundamentally in the field of technical assistance, which would have a positive impact on the efforts to reduce the asymmetries between the two sides. When technical assistance was formulated as an instrument for cooperation on the part of the South, it was essentially conceptualized in reference to the creation of an agenda of solidarity among developing countries.

The countries of the South can transmit their own valuable experiences based on the principle of reciprocal solidarity. With regard to the transition to democracy, these include the reform of the military or police, the establishment of institutions responsible for the respect and promotion of human rights, the support of constitutional or legal frameworks or the call for elections, and the lessons learned from the development experiences. When dealing with highly sensitive issues which are so closely linked to the political and institutional identity of a country, then cultural affinity, a common language and the existence of historical bonds on equal terms present clear comparative advantages. For this reason, when
defining cooperation policy from the South, aid within the same region should occupy a preferential place.

5. South-South cooperation was at the center of the concerns of those who promoted the Buenos Aires Plan which, as stated earlier, took up the position that sought to reflect a dynamic confluence between complementary interests of the North and South. The conviction that the expansion of relations and of international cooperation, as well as interdependence, would progressively grow, was the basis of the Plan, which demanded equal and sovereign participation in the direction of international relations and equal distribution of the benefits. The meeting of the 30th anniversary of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action to be held in Kenya in June of 2009 should present a crucial opportunity to revisit and update this grouping of problems.

6. In operational terms, the triangular modality of ICD is a promising field. Politically, it is crucial to avoid the triangulation aspect from feeding the perception of its “instrumentality” on the part of the community of donors, as it could realistically constitute a path toward the conceptual and practical reconfiguration of IC. The countries of the South with experience in South-South cooperation, which also preserve channels of interaction with the North from the position of recipient [as is the case of Argentina] could play a relevant role in this process.

It is premature to say what impact the current international financial crisis, with its accompanying recessive consequences on the real economy, will have on ICD. A drastic reduction in assistance as a result of this crisis, which global public opinion considers a consequence of the market excesses in the wealthy countries, would have a negative impact on relations and would be potentially destabilizing. Within this framework, technical cooperation among developing countries on a South-South level
takes on a new importance. The donors of the North have the opportunity to support initiatives which originate in the South and which take advantage of their know-how and experience, without depending on an excessive transfer of funds, through schemes of triangular cooperation.

7. The arguments that claimed that MICs can and must expand their activities as a source of cooperation for LICs gained special relevance. However, the new postulates of IC have not yet been assimilated by the developing countries and warrant a more in-depth discussion in the different regions. In Latin America countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Mexico, who are more and more committed to South-South cooperation, will be able to make important contributions both at a conceptual level as well as through concrete actions of technical cooperation based on their own recent experiences. The conformation of an ABC+M group for follow-up of the global ICD agenda would play a relevant role in the global and regional agenda of development cooperation.

The advances accomplished in South-South cooperation should presume the capacity for proposals concerning the agenda for North-South cooperation. More importantly, as this relates to countries identified as new donors, it seems key to avoid a passive inclusion in the roster of players that participate in the international community for development. Both the conference for the 30th anniversary of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action in 2009 and the meeting planned for 2010 to evaluate the objectives established by the Paris Declaration would be auspicious moments to present common affirmative positions.

8. From the perspective of the South, the multiplication of MICs and the new importance of emerging economies makes the global scenario more complex, though potentially richer in possibilities than that which surrounded Bandung in 1955 or even
Buenos Aires in 1978. The pieces move on a board where the inconsistent and fragmented South broadens its resources before a North with a world-view which, while not unique, operates solely on the basis of consensuses which feed off of each other.

As expressed in this work, the nations and associations of the South were the primary stimulus to expand and enrich the concept of development, and with it the cooperation policies. These countries today can help and be helped by their peers through the transfer and exchange of know-how and techniques based on the programs of eradication of poverty which culminate in the return to the workplace, the policies concerning women and children, small agricultural production and other actions carried out within the framework of the MDGs, with an approach that seeks to transform the recipients themselves into agents of change.

9. At the level of foreign policy, it is worth examining the possibility of exchanging legal, technical and even political knowledge with other countries of the South with the aim of coordinating their participation in the multilateral forums, which would serve to perfect the capabilities for dialogue and negotiation with the community of donors. This could have the effect of facilitating the adoption of common positions, although cooperation would have to avoid being conditioned by political agreements. However, the spread of multiple lines of dialogue and affirmative participation give the countries of the South the opportunity to influence the policies of North-South cooperation that should be taken advantage of.

It is for this reason that the governments of the South should define policies for North-South and South-South cooperation and their priorities based on available resources as well as their institutional and professional capabilities. The ministries and other relevant state entities need to examine their capabilities and be willing to formulate proposals. In this case the recommendation would be the creation of an inter-ministry mechanism, with intra- and inter-state coordination carried out by the foreign ministries or other entities with the appropriate level of decision-making power.

10. The current scenario of multiplicity of players that perform within the sphere of ICD, many times in conditions of precarious preparation, makes urgent the need to promote new ties between the North and the South in order to improve the efficiency of IC as practiced by the community of donors. The growing number of non-governmental organizations from the North operating in IC should not become an additional factor of North-South asymmetry. In addition to the capabilities of the public sector, it would be convenient for the MICs to improve their local coordination with professional entities, academia, non-govern-
mental organizations or private companies. This would broaden the capabilities for dialogue with the North, even more so in the current context of variety of players that participate in the community of donors.

11. If the national development responded to the economic models of internal direction, its crisis coincided with the impact of neo-liberal orthodoxy on a great part of the developing world and the current stage would correspond with the emergence of a post-developmental framework. This framework could become a common field of interests for the MICs in their dialogue with the North. The impact of post-developmentalism on IC is more visible in the area of multilateral, global and regional organizations than the agencies of the donor countries.

This approach leads to value being given to the traditional local cultures that must be preserved to ensure the protection of rights and better conditions for resistance against modernity. The dialogue between post-developmentalism and post-modernism is reflected in IC, especially in decentralized cooperation.

12. The presence and new responsibilities taken on by the MICs in the international community of cooperation represent a political challenge for both the South and the North. The unfortunate label of “emerging donors” supposes a South-North process of assimilation, which rarely corresponds with the type of activity and expectation transmitted by the cooperation policies of these countries.

Nevertheless, there will have to be consideration that the type of perspective and position of these countries when dealing with the North’s cooperation agenda could assume different forms, from a [free?] mimesis to the configuration of an alternative proposal which could eventually be antagonistic. This wide range of options, aside from making more questionable the application of a label with a sense of uniformity, underlines a political challenge within the South for the development of common positions before the community of donors, whether bilateral, within the multilateral sphere or in the ever-expanding universe of new and varied [public and private] non-governmental players.

From an “exploration” standpoint, three paths can be identified, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive, which in the context of the Big Push of IC would establish the guidelines for interaction with the North for this segment: 1) Autonomous pragmatism; 2) Defensive idealism; 3) prestigious outsourcing. The first case involves the predominance of policy which seeks to leave out the condition of recipient and reinforce the particularities of South-South cooperation through each country’s own horizontal cooperation policy, which results
in the possibility to pick and choose triangulation offers in fields or countries with which there is an affinity, and with assistance from the North, with consideration for political priorities and economic, institutional and technical resources. The participation in triangulation projects responds to selective criteria meant to preserve their own autonomy margins.

The second modality aims to find compatibility in the double condition of recipient and donor as a source of legitimacy toward both the North and South, and implies a preference for South-South projects as well as a critical view of the Big Push and recent norms employed by the community of donors. Both options imply a preference for cooperation actions that are carried out by national governments.

The third option considers the post-Monterrey situation and the creation of new fields of cooperation through decentralized and triangular actions as a framework of opportunity for broadening ties with the industrialized world, with positive implications and “trickle-down” effects for the respective political and economic interests [a way to invert tied cooperation maintaining the same logic].

Although the three options are not mutually exclusive, their overlapping could give way to ambiguous policies, which always represents a source of weakness and erosion in North-South and South-South relations.

13. As was stated at the start of this document, ICD has always been a reflection of North-South relations. The presence of South-South cooperation, seen as an advance in IC, can (and must) imply an expansion of the circle of interests and political views, leading to an inclusive dynamic. ICD should represent an instrument for the reduction of the gap between center and periphery in the international system. It should be the very definition of efficiency, so sought after and defended by the community of donors. However, in order to be effective, there must be a transformation of North-South cooperation, a deconstruction, in fact, which would imply ruling it out as a soft variable of international power.
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The old and the new in a conceptualization of South-South cooperation. Conceptual contributions and recommendations for Argentine policy.

**SCENARIOS AND CHALLENGES IN SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION 30 YEARS AFTER THE BUENOS AIRES DECLARATION**

Director: Miryam Colacrai
Lead Investigator: Alejandra Kern
Investigators: Miguel Vallone, Valeria Pattacini, Lara Weisstaub
Administrative Coordination: Ana Donini, Federico Merke

CARRIED OUT BY THE CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (CENTRO DE INVESTIGACION EN COOPERACION INTERNACIONAL Y DESARROLLO OR CICI+D) OF THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SAN MARTIN.
ABSTRACT

30 years after the Buenos Aires Declaration on TCDC [Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries] and taking into account the changes which have taken place in the international system, the path taken by the developing countries, the appearance of new players in international cooperation and the elusiveness of the concept of South-South cooperation, this document has been elaborated with a dual purpose:

In the first place, it has focused on **following the conceptual evolution**, observing small changes, increases and decreases in its relevance, its application in different scenarios, the fragmentation suffered by the South during the 1980’s and the manner in which international cooperation was “adapted” to the neoliberal economic order in the nineties. In this way, it seeks to reclaim the value of South-South cooperation in the current situation of international financial crisis which spans multiple levels of human activity.

Secondly, it analyzes the key concepts which sustain the definition of South-South cooperation in a sampling of Latin American countries, as the design of a joint strategy that enables the region to position itself in the principal forums of international discussion will require those involved to, basically, “speak the same language”. In addition, this document presents some contributions with regard to policy and possible scenarios, with proposals for Argentina in looking for consensuses and suggestions for tasks related to its own performance.
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Development, the well-being of the citizens, the building of more equitable societies, united, in open dialogue with the environment, with solid institutions that not only set goals for countries within the framework of their national policies, but also guarantee good governability, can all be strengthened through international cooperation.

Different agreements and global agendas promote joint action between developed and developing countries. However, South-South cooperation plays a decisive role in those global initiatives to eradicate poverty, stimulate economic growth and promote sustainable development.

In the past 50 years we have observed an endless number of definitions and ideas related to North-South issues, while at the same time seeing the development of the notion of “South-South relations”. We have also played a major role in the fluctuations in the international system which have given way to new forms of cooperation, efforts which took place “from the bottom up”, as well as those that dismissed the relevance of cooperation among equals, emphasizing asymmetrical relations with a strong basis in economism.

This scenario of international cooperation seems to be taking an important turn, emphasizing the notion of giving new value to South-South cooperation, within which developing countries learn how to better apply the policies and best practices of other developing countries, taking into consideration their national priorities.

At this time, the financial, food and climate-change crises which are being experienced globally demand even greater cooperation between developing countries. Like never before, developing countries are being called upon to face, in a collective manner, multiple challenges of a global nature which threaten to revert revert the advance of development.
In this context, the viability of South-South cooperation will depend on the degree of coherence employed in formulating strategies and the nature of the relations between the nations involved. The building of bridges between southern countries requires creating the appropriate atmosphere, having greater knowledge of each other, choosing priorities, as well as effective and long-lasting strategies so the processes involved in improving capabilities become a real contribution toward development.

Among the problems to be faced in order to solidify South-South cooperation is how to transform what is essentially an expression of desire into concrete and meaningful actions, a difficult task considering that current practices tend to go in the opposite direction.

At the same time, it becomes necessary to capitalize on the experience obtained in the field of South-South cooperation, given that when it has been implemented in a systematic manner, with attainable goals and continuity over time, it has proven to be an effective instrument in increasing capabilities and maximizing complementarities. It is also of vital importance to acknowledge the existence of underutilized potential that can become viable in the search for improved performance on a regional level and a more just and effective inclusion in the international system.

Although the idea of South-South cooperation is not centered on attaining wealth or political power, there have been different perspectives which have attempted to characterize the relations involved. From its inception and initial policies, an altruistic and romantic viewpoint was adopted, highlighting the idea that the “needy and destitute” of the international system had formed an alliance in order to stand up to the industrialized North, through solidarity, cooperation and horizontal actions. From another perspective, the emphasis was put on national and collective self-confidence, and development was seen as the result of decreasing dependence on the North, for which cooperation between these countries was seen as a necessity and constituted a political strategy.

The trajectory of South-South cooperation, its inception, its implementation, the changes it has experienced, the updating of its content, are all interests of this text. We seek to identify and group within a timeline different conceptions with regard to cooperation among developing countries,
“...the idea of South-South cooperation is not centered on attaining wealth or political power, there have been different perspectives which have attempted to characterize the relations involved...”

or South-South cooperation. In this evolution we can observe changes in content, motivation and objectives, which reflects, as well as establishes, specific moments in the relations between those countries most vulnerable to the political and economic structures of the international system.

The first part of this document describes the evolution of the concept in the multilateral sphere of the United Nations until the end of the 1990’s, emphasizing the particular characteristics of the historical context and the characteristics of the system of North-South cooperation, within which we find these definitions.

The second part contains an in-depth analysis of the context of the changes which took place in the international system and in the different spheres of international cooperation (South-South and North-South), all of which creates a demand for new and specific content for South-South cooperation.

Finally, and taking into account the concepts which come from the ideas elaborated in the multilateral field, as well as those coming from the actions and objectives found on a national level, the last part contains some ideas meant to make a contribution in consolidating South-South cooperation with regard to its concepts, as well as some suggestions with regard to policies for its implementation.
PART I.

ORIGIN AND CONCEPTUAL EVOLUTION
OF SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION
UNTIL THE LATE 1990’S
1. First stage ('60-'70): Promoting a change in the international economic order

1.1 Political context

In the 1960's and 70's climate was created which fostered more just relations, the creation of a new international economic order, the fight against colonialism, the search for new forms of association between the so-called "Third World" nations, and the discussion concerning the general principles which would allow for the transformation of the relations between the States and the International System.

The economic, political and social structures implanted in colonial times resulted, for the most part, in the relative isolation of the developing countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia from each other, with insignificant commercial ties, a profound lack of knowledge of each other, as well as a series of mutual conflicts, which also became contributing factors in underdevelopment and external dependence.

It becomes necessary to look at the history of the Non-Aligned Movement, and to look at its beginnings in Bandung (1955), the Preparatory Conference in Cairo (1960), and its proper formalization at the Belgrade Summit (1961), as milestones in the emergence of new forms of political cooperation.

At the first meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, the issue of North-South cooperation was even a topic of discussion, highlighting the need for the nations receiving assistance to participate in establishing cooperation policies. This position was reiterated in some U.N. bodies, most notably the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), which gave voice to those demanding development aid.

The global map of international relations and cooperations took a significant turn during the second post-war period, not only because it marked the beginning of the decolonization period—which resulted in the establishment of new states— but also because of the emergence, practically at the same time, of a renewed spirit of "internationalism" which aimed to provide an identity for the relations among the states of lesser relative development. Within the context of the Cold War, these countries attempted to find alternative...
ties which would allow them a greater degree of autonomy in international relations, as well as give them more room to maneuver with regard to the policies of the Major Powers and the manner in which they designed the International Order. With regard to North-South relations, the Cold War marked a strong political and geo-strategic orientation in policies of development assistance, based on the self-interest of the principal powers, depending on how it related to the East-West conflict. Also under the logic of the East-West conflict, in the 1960's the colonial powers utilized assistance policies to consolidate their presence and influence in the new post-colonial era, and other industrialized countries began to create and/or consolidate agencies and aid programs.

In this context, the idea of generating a dynamic for South-South relations was closely linked to the possibility of redirecting and prioritizing existing ties, reinforcing existing bilateral relations, creating new ties to increase their own development perspectives and, from there, creating a space which gave them greater negotiating power in multilateral forums. This idea reinforced actions that had already manifested themselves in under-developed countries as forms of opposition against the North, in conjunction with the struggle against colonialism, dependence, and exploitation of the weakest nations.

The first important conceptual debate concerning the reorganization of global economic structures took place within the framework of the first meeting of the UNCTAD (Geneva, 1964) whose purpose was the integration of developing countries into the global economy, within a promising setting for development. In this setting, the role played by the nations in the Group of 77, as well as that of a group of Latin American countries, was of great importance. This platform was used to articulate the needs and interests of the developing countries and promote political cooperation between them in multilateral spaces, such as the General Assembly, The Economic and Social Council and other specialized agencies of the United Nations.

Outside the sphere of the United Nations, it is worth noting the constitution of other forums for solidarity between Third World countries; particularly the OSPAAAL (Organization of Solidarity of the People of Asia, Africa and Latin America), for its tri-continental quality, which aimed to promote “solidarity with the demands and the struggles of the peoples of the Third World” (Havana, 1966).

With regard to Latin America, the Latin American Economic System (Sistema Económico Latinoamericano or SELA) was constituted at the Convention of Panama, October 17th, 1975, positioning itself as a mechanism to solidify South-South cooperation, in this

3. This period could be characterized as dominated by the United States in matters of aid, apart from the existence of multilateral programs and the appearance in 1954 of the Assistance Program of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

4. It is of particular importance to us to remember that the first Secretary General of the UNCTAD was the Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch, whose ideas had great influence in strategies and policies on economic and social development in developing countries. Among his innumerable accomplishments, it is worth mentioning how he called the attention of the international community to attitudes in the relations of developed nations with developing ones, in addition to making substantial modifications to the traditional outlines of international division of labor. From within the UNCTAD, Prebisch promoted processes of commercial negotiations between rich and poor countries and stimulated the evolution of new approaches toward multilateral diplomacy for development...
case between Latin American countries and their projections, though this organization, to the outside world in general and other developing countries in Asia and Africa, in particular.

It is worth mentioning that there were already spaces that encouraged South-South cooperation on the bilateral, sub-regional and regional levels, in Latin America as well as in Asia and Africa, before programs like the Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries (ECDC) and Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC) were announced. At any rate, the distinctive aspect of these cases was that the emphasis was placed on the interregional perspective and was directly linked to the actions of developing countries within the framework of the United Nations.

As a result of this mobilization of the South, within the U.N. Assembly, the 1960's were called the "Decade of Development". Together with this proposal, it was the first time a call was made to increase the flow of aid. In the official declaration of the Decade of Development a significant increase was requested in the flow of international aid to developing countries (approximately 1% of the combined national product of the economically advanced countries). In this way, the decade constituted as much a stage for strengthening relations between developing countries, as one for strengthening the claims put to the developed nations.

A retrospective look shows how the precedent for the TCDC on a global scale can be found in the 1960's, in the summits in Belgrade, Cairo, Lusaka and Algiers held by the Non-Aligned nations. The term was coined in 1973 at the U.N. General Assembly in which the developing countries demanded of each other more dynamic actions of mutual aid to face their economic and social condition.

The result of these demands would solidify in Buenos Aires in 1978, where the World Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries was held, in which the countries that were present adopted the Buenos Aires Plan of Action. This plan established a general outline concerning technical cooperation. The Latin American countries held four preparatory meetings in which they elaborated a joint position for the World Conference in Buenos Aires: the Regional Meeting on TCDC in Lima (1976), the Action Program for the promotion of TCDC (1976), the Meeting of Officials Responsible for the Technical Cooperation of the Latin American Countries (1977) and the Meeting for Latin American Coordination, held within the framework of SELA.

5. This first declaration created a marked optimism with regard to the possibility to accelerate growth rates of developing countries.
1.2. Conceptual content

The concept of cooperation among developing countries formally entered the multilateral sphere of the United Nations at the Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC), held in Buenos Aires in 1978. A singular characteristic of the Buenos Aires meeting of 1978 was the laxness with which the properties of TCDC were defined. Somehow, the relevance of cooperation began to lie not only in its content, but on the fact that it implied joint activity between the governments in the region. It almost seemed to be an exercise in making contact and increasing mutual knowledge between the governments, meant to show the possibility, the importance and the effectiveness of collaboration and cooperation in the region. This also highlights the political aspect of the event.

The record of the conference showed a process of significant change in the structure of the international system through the decolonization process, recognizing that the new states—which represented “the vast majority of the world population”—began to participate in international affairs. It was believed that this participation also brought changes “in the control and distribution of resources, and in the capabilities and needs of nations.”

This change was perceived as an opportunity for joint action on the part of the developing countries, intended to transform the international economic order established after World War II; cooperation between equals was labeled as something “new” in cooperation for development. The Buenos Aires Declaration expressed:

“Technical cooperation among developing countries has emerged as a new dimension of international cooperation for development, which expresses the determination of the developing world to reach its national and collective capabilities in order to survive on its own, and the need to create a new international economic order.”

Considering the perception shared at the Conference regarding this context, it is worth noting some particular items of the concept coined on this occasion. In the first place, the word “cooperation,” and not “assistance,” was used, as it was used in the field of North-South relations, reflecting a notion of greater symmetry and alluding to the notion of “joint work” rather than “transfer.” This highlighted the search for “mutual benefit” in this process.

In the second place, the common identifying point makes no reference to the geographical aspect of the “South,” but rather to a shared identity, represented by the search for “development.” This reference coincided with the predominant notion of develop-
“Technical cooperation among developing countries has emerged as a new dimension of international cooperation for development, which expresses the determination of the developing world to reach its national and collective capabilities in order to survive on its own, and the need to create a new international economic order”

ment as a lineal process that all countries could go through. In this lineal continuum, then, there were those nations that were "developed" and those that were still going through the process, "developing".

The third characteristic was the appeal to a specific modality of cooperation: technical cooperation. This made an implicit distinction between financial cooperation and technical cooperation, dismissing the former – seen as a transfer of capital – precisely because this was one of the resources of which developing countries were in greatest shortage.

This modality implied that developing countries could "...create, acquire, adapt, transfer and share knowledge and experiences for their mutual benefit and to accomplish national and collective self-sufficiency, which is essential for its social and economic development". In this way, the assertion that TCDC was a "multidimensional process" and its reach could be "bilateral or multilateral" and its character "sub-regional, regional or inter-regional".


In the fourth place, there was a reference to an essentially inter-state process. Cooperation should “...be organized between the governments, which can, to that end, promote the participation of public organizations and, within the framework of the policies established by the government, that of private organizations and private citizens” (Bs.As, 78:4). This reflected another concept widely shared by the international society regarding the State as a key player in development.

Fifth, there was no reference to any type of concessions, which marks a major difference with North-South cooperation. Cooperation between equals who share disadvantages in the structure of the international system and which cooperate for the sake of mutual benefit, excludes this idea.

Lastly, it is important to point out that TCDC, although it was understood that it represented a new dimension in cooperation for development, was not expected to replace the cooperation from developed countries, ya as there was still a need for "the transfer of advanced technology and other forms of expertise in which these countries have a clear advantage". La CTPD podía ser más bien complementaria, TCDC could be complementary to it with the purpose of “...increasing the capacity of institutions in developing countries to adapt and absorb the necessary resources coming from developed countries”.

The importance of joint action of the developing countries for the transformation of the international economic system was also reflected in initiatives of economic cooperation, as a different field of technical cooperation. In 1979, there were references to this type of cooperation both in the G-77 and the U.N. General Assembly. In that year, the G-77 approved the "Mid- and Long term Action Plan for Priorities on Issues of Economic Cooperation." These included a general system of commercial preferences, creation of multinational companies, cooperation among state commercialization organizations, setting up or reinforcing national centers for the transfer of technology, multilateral agreements on payments and credit, analysis of the possibility of creating a bank of developing countries, elaboration of studies for establishing multinational companies for production between developing countries, and elaboration of information exchange programs in different areas⁹. Within the framework of the U.N. General Assembly, it was also pointed out that this type of cooperation constituted “…an indispensable element in the promotion of structural changes to contribute to a balanced and equitable process of global economic development in which the developing countries intensify their mutual economic cooperation in order to increase their capabilities and attend to their needs in matters of development”¹⁰.

While recognizing the close relation between the objectives of technical cooperation and economic cooperation, they were defined as different areas of action, the latter being commonly referred to as "South-South" cooperation. The truth is that the motivation and drive of this type of cooperation were essentially political, and the aim was to use it to produce a change in the economic structure of the international system.

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⁹. Maldonado, Guillermo, "El SELA y la cooperación Sur-Sur", Nueva Sociedad 60 (May-June 1982), 11

2. Second Stage (’80): The fragmentation of the “South”

The decade began with high expectations in the framework of the United Nations, where developing countries had made a commitment to strengthen cooperation between them. It would be guided by the same objective as that of the previous decade: to establish, through collective action, a new international economic order, one more just and favorable to this group of nations.

This objective was clearly reflected in the Plenary Session of the General Assembly of 1979, in the adoption of a definition of cooperation among developing countries, which highlighted the idea that it constituted a means to building an international order based on principles of cooperation. It was stated that,

“Developing countries will actively promote technical and economic cooperation among themselves, as a basic element of the efforts to establish a new international economic order, which is based on cooperation among all States.”

In this context, was seen as the manifestation of the efforts of a relatively uniform group –developing countries– aimed at strengthening their economic possibilities and improving their position in the system of international economic relations.

Through collective action, developing countries proposed to achieve political and economic autonomy from the northern countries. This objective seemed highly possible due to the movements initiated by the southern countries. The atmosphere at the time was reflected in statements like the following:

“Developing countries are establishing economic and political positions of crucial importance in the international arena; and the growing importance of the South’s role is an irrevocable trend. In order to strengthen even more their positions in global politics and the economic struggle, these countries need to develop strategies which will ensure their economic, political and cultural emancipation from the North.”

It was in this spirit that in 1980 the High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation was created within the United Nations. This committee would monitor the advances in the Buenos Aires Plan. As was to be expected, given the extent of the concept defined in the plan, the committee’s evaluations were not limited to technical cooperation and covered the wider dimension of the concept defined in the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, making express references to the processes of political and economic cooperation.


The expectations at the start of the 1980’s did not come to fruition. One of the principal causes was, without a doubt, the crisis of debt and fragmentation which resulted from the individual negotiation strategies of the countries of the South.

The so-called “debt crisis”, but particularly the responsibility attributed to the countries in debt, had a significant effect on the predominant ideas concerning development and cooperation. At the North-South level, aid was channeled through programs for structural change through economic and financial reform which took for granted the death of structural economics and State intervention. The criticism of the State and the praise given to free market forces directly affected the justification for aid. Aid was even seen as counterproductive, in that it amplified an anomaly detected in the developing countries: the excess in state bureaucracy. In addition, if the market was capable of promoting development on its own, why continue with the assistance?

At the South-South level, and in a highly fragmented context, some of the critical points of North-South cooperation also began to be reflected, which made evident the need to create a different conception. In this respect, a tension began to surface in the conceptions of foreign policy of the countries of the South, which were based on “national interests” and the expectations of cooperation between them. As the Nigerian expert U. Joy-Ogwu pointed out:

“Perhaps the most significant challenge faced by the concept of “South-South” is the interpretation that each of the participants makes of their own national interests. Every nation defines the objective of its foreign policy as the protection of its national interests. The problem is: in what measure can a narrow conception of national interests make South-South relations difficult? Clearly, the participating nations should broaden their interpretation of their national interests in order to build a foundation for South-South dialogue on the basis of concrete realities.”

As this same author maintained, one of the paths toward broadening the definition of “interest” was to promote a greater participation from the civilian population, promoting transnational relations. Then, a change toward “extra-institutional” forms of cooperation, understood as “extra-state,” could mitigate the fear of paternalism, one of the critical points both at the South-South level and the North-South level.

Throughout the entire decade, there is a marked silence in documentation on South-South cooperation in the multilateral sectors, particularly in the U.N. The fragmentation of the South during this period made evident the problems of this type of cooperation and was not able to create an alternate and consensual vision in order to overcome them.

3. Third Stage (´90): Adapting cooperation to the neoliberal economic order

The international system of the Cold War was marked by strong ideological differences sustained by irreconcilable conceptions of society and State. The early 1990’s bring a significant break in the existing international order. Gradually, though in a disorderly and sometimes contradictory manner, the new mechanisms and modalities of international dominance begin to be defined. The fall of the Berlin wall, the collapse of the U.S.S.R., and the dissolution of the eastern bloc, led to the design of a new geopolitical map which proclaimed the victory of the capitalist model.

At the same time, the globalization process, which in certain political and academic circles became part of an acritical line of thought, was perceived as being inexorable. Notwithstanding the multiple existing definitions, “globalization” refers to the group of interrelated processes which, with growing interaction and interdependence, are generated among the different units which constitute the new global system currently being

The expectations at the start of the 1980’s did not come to fruition. One of the principal causes was, without a doubt, the crisis of debt and fragmentation which resulted from the individual negotiation strategies of the countries of the South.
formed, including the expansion of geographical spaces and the modification of the spheres of action of the new international players. Taken in all its complexity, it can be understood as a process characterized by the proliferation of the flow of ideas, people, products, services and capital which leads to an increase in the material and symbolic interdependence of economies and societies, and which has also influenced the formation of the new paradigm of international cooperation. In this context, there has been an intensification in the processes of integration of the economies with a market which is becoming increasingly more global in terms of finance, commerce and production. This has resulted in a change in the patterns of North-South development aid.

Economic liberalization was presented to the developing world as the answer to inefficient strategies associated with commercial protection, to the high levels of state intervention, and to the generation of income by the economic agents; it was also presented as the way to take fullest advantage of the opportunities provided by globalization. The success of the newly industrialized countries in Southeast Asia, based on the adoption of a strategy of outward growth, was presented as a clear indicator that openness and integration with the international market constituted a solid base for growth and economic development. The development of these countries was also a key differentiating element which shattered the sense of uniformity of the “South” in terms of problems related to development and international economic ties.

In this stage there was also a resurgence of a certain degree of conditionality in ODA, similar to that seen in the 1960’s, based on the iron rule: “those who reform, receive resources”. In this sense, and prioritizing...
the effectiveness of the aid, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) emphasized that it had only worked in those developing countries which had made their own efforts, as well, and which had strong institutions. In this way, the North-South scheme incorporated a series of political and industrial prerequisites in order to provide assistance, among them an honest and stable political framework, good government and widespread participation of the local population. These prerequisites constituted the notion of "selectivity", thus giving a new name to the conditions established for receiving aid. This resulted in a channeling of the resources involved in North-South cooperation, even to countries of lesser relative development, towards the creation of institutional competencies in the area of economic policies, the establishment of clear priorities with regard to development, the strengthening of administrative capacities and, overall, the improvement of the governability in the countries receiving cooperation.

In this context of reduction and restriction of North-South cooperation, South-South cooperation had an important space to fill, also linked to the new conception of human development proposed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). As was reflected in the report presented by the High-Level Committee in 1993, despite dramatic changes in the international economic system as of the late 1980's which affected the economies of many developing countries, these had not managed to improve the possibilities for TCDC based, among other things, on an increase in the disparities between developing countries. However, in this process of growing differentiation of the South and of the search for a greater individual and competitive insertion of many of these countries in the global economy, a new opportunity was lost.

In 1995, the United Nations General Assembly recognized the importance of South-South cooperation as a means of achieving two objectives which are difficult to articulate within one process: "self-sufficiency..."


16. In the early 1990's, the UNDP sponsored, communicated and implemented the concept of human development introduced by the economist Mabuh Ul Haq. The concept of 'human development' extended the idea of economic growth and development of material capabilities, putting the focus on the options and capabilities of the people, in all fields. The idea expressed by Ul Haq does not imply a break with previous ideas, as it still considers economic growth a necessity, to the extent of sometimes requiring adjustment processes to maintain it, but he sees it more as a means for achieving elevated levels of human development than as an end in and of itself.

17. PUNDP, High-Level Committee on TCDC, "New Directions for TCDC", 1996.

18. The case of Argentina was very clear in its break with the G77 and the Non-Aligned Group.
“...in this process of growing differentiation of the South and of the search for a greater individual and competitive insertion of many of these countries in the global economy, a new opportunity was lost...”

What this concept reflected was actually an adjustment of the original political characteristics of cooperation among developing countries – the strength and autonomy of the group against the developed world – to the reality of economic globalization which was at that time perceived as being irrevocable. Therefore, the idea was to attempt an integration into the international economy which would be beneficial, or rather “effective”, trying to sustain a base of self-sufficiency. As it turned out, this idea was not very realistic, as the logic of interdependence, dictates that integration into the system from a position of greater vulnerability would imply giving up a great margin of autonomy.

Keeping with this line of thought, there was talk of “giving shape to the forces of globalization and economic liberalization,” but not of changing to other forms of production and exchange. These ideas reflect a significant change in the central objective of South-South cooperation. Throughout this decade, cooperation among developing countries was not defined as an instrument used to change the world order, but rather as a vehicle used to adapt to the neoliberal economic order which imposed itself as the triumphant model alter the fall of the U.S.S.R. The following quote clearly reflects the atmosphere at the time:

“Stemming from the recent trends toward globalization, there is a greater acknowledgement of technical cooperation among developing countries as an important instrument which allows the southern countries to participate effectively in the new world order which is...”

19. United Nations General Assembly, 50th session; Economic and Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries; 2.
emerging, even more so considering the current trend of industrialized countries reducing official development assistance, in particular with respect to funding for multilateral programs and organizations.  

On the other hand, in this decade the processes of regional integration acquired an important push and were perceived as the principal instrument in South-South cooperation, no longer as an exclusively inter-state relationship, but also as a space for creating business ties. Within the framework of the United Nations, it was emphasized that:

“cooperation and integration on a sub-regional and regional level is becoming the primary pillar in the current process of reactivating South-South cooperation. New integration organizations are being created where there were none before, and the previously existing ones are becoming stronger and greater in depth and breadth, not only geographically but also in matters of substance. This trend is not limited to official initiatives between governments, but has also led to the establishment of different links between companies.”

...Throughout this decade, cooperation among developing countries was not defined as an instrument used to change the world order, but rather as a vehicle used to adapt to the neoliberal economic order...”

In this context, it was considered necessary to work towards a greater coordination between technical cooperation and economic cooperation in South-South relations. The report of the South Commission of 1993 pointed out, for instance, the importance of reinforcing cooperation in areas such as finance, commerce, the industrial and business sectors, services, transport and infrastructure, among others, as well as revitalizing economic cooperation and integration agreements at the regional and sub-regional levels.

In the mid 1990’s, the U.N. tried to give new drive to TCDC by passing, in the General Assembly, the proposal on New Directions, drawn up by the High-level Committee on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries. The document proposed a more strategic direction for TCDC, centered on the matters of highest priority and with important repercussions in a great number of developing countries. These matters, however, included a wide range of issues: commerce and investment, debt, the environment, reducing poverty, production and employment, coordination of macroeconomic policies, education, health, transfer of technology...
and rural development. The report recommended, as one of the central initiatives, carrying out a closer operational integration between the technical cooperation and the economic cooperation. It also proposed some initiatives in order to improve operational matters of TCDC developed up to that point, in order to increase effectiveness: identify pivotal countries that serve as catalysts for this cooperation, compile information on successful and innovative projects that could be replicated and identify “specific TCDC products, by field, that could attract financing.”

In that context, the General Assembly also appealed to all the governments and pertinent organizations of the United Nations to consider the possibility of increasing the funds for TCDC and to look for new financing modalities to promote South-South cooperation [essentially triangular cooperation and participation from the private sector].

Following the recommendations on the new direction, the UNDP elaborated the “First TCDC Cooperation Framework (1997-1999).” The document focused on two areas of work. The first, essentially conceptual, proponed to give support for sustainable human development, with particular emphasis on the eradication of poverty, the environment, production and employment, commerce, investments and macroeconomic management. In the second place, the goal was to improve implementation by promoting TCDC through the formulation and coordination of policies, the improvement of capacities and the support of information. As an operational change for greater effectiveness, it proposed a strategy based on results-based management, emphasizing the focus on programs, coherence and impact.

This document, elaborated near the end of the decade, highlighted the difficulties that globalization and the development programs based on free market forces had had in these countries. It recognized that, despite the macroeconomic stability that was reached, there were still high levels of poverty and social exclusion. It was also understood that many developing countries, particularly in Africa, lacked the sufficiently developed production capabilities needed to face the threat of the global economy, unless the international community took special steps to provide support. In contrast to this, the international context presented the experiences of countries that had achieved a significant level of economic growth, particularly the new industrialized economies of eastern Asia, and which represented an important opportunity for South-South cooperation. It was assumed that this differentiation of the South would provide a solid base for the sharing of experiences, especially in terms of new techniques and organizational approaches for production which could improve the productive and the competitive position of the developing economies.

To this end, TCDC was considered not only cost-effective but also an alternative capable of transmitting experiences that were closer and more relevant to the realities and challenges faced by other developing countries.

Lastly, it is worth noting another characteristic of TCDC during this period. It was redefined in relation to the players that carried it out, widening their scope. The U.N. adopted a definition that transcended the inter-state relation agreed upon in 1978:

“South-South cooperation entails bilat-
eral and multilateral relations between governments, institutions, companies, private citizens and non-governmental organizations from two or more developing countries from the same region or different regions.\textsuperscript{26} “

To sum up, this period was marked by an important transformation in the international system, both in terms of structure as well as ideology. The end of bipolarism and the dominance of neoliberal ideas had as much of an impact on North-South cooperation as on South-South cooperation. In the latter there is a change in the political objectives, as the goal was no longer to change the international economic order, but rather to find the best manner for the developing countries to integrate it. Adapting to this economic order implied leaving more room for the market to act and reducing participation of the State as the driving and planning force of development. This idea, advocated greater coordination between technical and economic cooperation, which meant subordinating the former to the latter. Technical cooperation, especially from those countries that had managed to achieve growth and an increase in their GDP, was, thus, restricted to the transfer of actions related to the adaptation from their economies to the international liberal order, or those that favored regional economic integration. On the other hand, while there was a proliferation of regional integration processes, there was also an increase in the fragmentation of the south as a group with a common identity.

The focus promoted within the United Nations, though it covered a wide range of issues, transformed TCDC into a functional instrument for this economic order, based on the experiences of those models considered “successful”.

\textsuperscript{26} United Nations General Assembly, 50th session, Operational Activities for Development: Economic and Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries. The State of South-South Cooperation; Secretary General’s report; 7. 1995.
4. Conclusions

From the preceding description, it becomes clear that the conceptual evolution of TCDC, or South-South cooperation, was not immune to the impact stemming from the changes in the international context, particularly from an ideological standpoint and with regard to the evolution of North-South relations. Faced with the reality of a group of countries in the semi-periphery, which acknowledge themselves as “emerging markets”, the map of the “South” also offers some variations, and its conceptualization becomes more complex. Also to be considered is the fact that the very concept of development leaves a different mark.

Despite variations in the concept, some ideas have remained constant which mark the particularities of South-South cooperation. The idea of “solidarity” is seen repeatedly as a major, and even foundational, criterion of TCDC. Another concept that stands out is that of “collective action” toward an “other,” which has appeared in the form of a developed North, an unjust international economic order or a globalization context offering opportunities.

The objective of autonomy and self-sufficiency was very strong during the first and second stages, but it became less marked and was even replaced in the 1990’s by the idea of “integration”.

Although the redefinition of South-South cooperation in the 90’s was linked to the adaptation of the developing countries to the criteria of the neoliberal economic order and was not able to create an alternate vision, it is important to point out two aspects of the legacy created during this period, which saw the end of the East-West conflict that had, for so many years, limited international relations in all its dimensions. In the first place, what was termed the end of the state paradigm, which allowed for the participation of other players, both private or on a sub-national level, as well as other channels for the actions of cooperation. In the second place, a growing conception of international cooperation in general, seen less as “welfare” and more participatory, which was reflected in terms such as “association” and “appropriation”, which fit very well in the context of cooperation based on mutual benefit and equality.

Another interesting aspect is that both in the 1970’s and the 1990’s, South-South cooperation was referred to as a “new” thing”. This was due to the fact that both periods were foundational, or “re-foundational”, of this type of cooperation, due to significant changes in the international context.

In the United Nations, there is an attempt in the mid 1990’s to give new drive to TCDC, and the General Assembly approves the proposal on New Directions, elaborated by the High-level Committee on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries.
PART II.

THE PRESENT DAY AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO CONSOLIDATE COOPERATION IN THE “GLOBAL SOUTH”
1. In the search for new definitions and international consensuses

1.1. The historical context post-1990’s

In order to understand the development of cooperation in the new century it becomes important to consider some events that marked a break with the international context of the previous decade, as well as some elements that have remained and which continue to influence international relations.

The September 11th attacks and subsequent war on terrorism constitute events that significantly marked the international agenda, making security issues a top priority. Since that moment, there has been a tendency toward the “securitization”27 of the cooperation agenda, which means that the motivations, objectives and destinations were increasingly directed toward the security priorities of the donor states, particularly the fight against terrorism. The rhetoric of many donors, especially the United States, revolved around the way in which the problems of poverty and underdevelopment are linked to the rise of terrorist groups, as if there were a direct causal relation between these problems, without contemplating the history and particular characteristics of each region. In this way, in North-South cooperation, the more altruistic and humanitarian motivations began to lose ground, once again, to the arguments related to national interests and security of the developed world. As stated by Sanahuja, "...in the new context of the 'global war on terrorism' the struggle against poverty seems to be relevant only insomuch as it is functional to the strategies employed in this 'war', or it serves to legitimize them"28.

At the same time, the economic crisis which began in countries like Argentina in late 2001 and which later spread throughout the region made evident the limitations of the neoliberal model and the recommendations of the Washington Consensus implemented in Latin America. A consequence of this was a significant political change in the region which led to the rise to power of progressive governments which acknowledged the relevance of the Nation-State in development planning.

On the other hand, among the elements that remain, globalization still constitutes a process that intensifies the interconnections between states and societies, with significant impact on economic, political and social levels. In this way, at the same time that the limitations of the free market on economic development became clear, there was an acknowledgement of the need for state action to, in some way, “administrate” the globalization process, as much on an internal as a global level. In this sense,


28. Ibid, p. 3
the virulence of the crises generated by the volatility of the financial capital or the impact brought on by the environmental breakdown began to create awareness regarding the need to resolve these problems as a community, and have helped to promote a new way to conceptualize cooperation associated with the provision of “global public goods”. This new spirit penetrated into the discourse on cooperation and began to break the differentiation between “donor” and “recipient”, giving way to talk of “association” and “shared responsibility”, as means to face “global problems”.

As far as the concept of development, the adjectives which emerged during the 1990’s, such as “human”, “participatory” and “sustainable”, fostered the creation of the more integrating concept of “sustainable human development”29. To this concept, now centered on the individual rather than the nation, has been added recently a collective element: the goal of reaching greater levels of “social cohesion”. Social cohesion begins to appear more emphatically on the agendas of international organizations, especially regional organizations in Europe and Latin America, when the failures of the proposals for structural reform put forth by the Washington Consensus make the social debt accumulated by these policies more and more visible30.

It is important to note that, while the concept of development has expanded and transcended the national sphere, North-South cooperation has limited its scope to the fight against poverty. Focusing on this objective reinforces the “welfare” aspect of cooperation and increases the funds aimed at the development of social and administrative infrastructure, while also restricting the space for projects aimed at supporting the production sectors31.

The changes in the concept of development, as well as those in the priorities of North-South cooperation, have been taking shape in the form of three initiatives that we consider essential in order to understand the context in which the discussion on South-South cooperation is being revitalized, these being: the agreement concerning the Millennium Development Goals, the Paris Declaration and the identifying of middle-income countries.

“...at the same time that the limitations of the free market on economic development became clear, there was an acknowledgement of the need for state action to, in some way, ‘administrate’ the globalization process...”

29. This concept has become broader and taken on a new shape with the idea of “development as freedom”, proposed by Amartya Sen.


“...while the concept of development has expanded and transcended the national sphere, North-South cooperation has limited its scope to the fight against poverty...”

The Millennium Goals constituted the result of a process consisting of the summarizing of the International Summits held during the 1990’s and the efforts to improve the efficiency of cooperation for development, particularly from the perspective of the donors of the DAC. The first reference appeared in the DAC document entitled “The role of cooperation for development in the dawn of the 21st century”32, which constituted the base for the joint declaration between the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group entitled 2000. A Better World for All33. In the heading of this document was the declaration that “poverty in all its forms is the greatest challenge to the international community,” after which, it continues: “Setting goals to reduce poverty is an essential part of the way forward”.

In line with these documents, the Millennium Declaration was approved in September of 2000 at the summit held within the context of the United Nations, with the participation of 191 countries (189 being member states at the time), including 147 heads of State or government. This “Millennium Summit institutionalized the consensus on the challenges that the international community had to face, agreeing on eight objectives to be reached, known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This agreement signified a turning point for the rules, norms and decision-making processes in the international cooperation system, insomuch as the international community defined specific objectives, indicators and mechanisms to reach them within a time frame which goes until the year 2015. The interpretation and impact of this process has several facets.

On the one hand, the MDGs are valuable as summaries of the debates held concerning the complexity of development on the international agenda and also represent guidelines for action on international cooperation. As Sanahuja says, “the appearance of the ‘social agenda’ implies acknowledgement that globalization requires having objectives and policies specifically aimed at social development” as well as questioning the premises of the neoliberal project for global economic integration34. In this respect, the eight objectives complement the classic idea of development, encompassed by the need to elevate the level of income to overcome economic poverty (MDG 1) with proposals in the area of education (MDG 2), health (MDG 4, 5 and 6), social participation (MDG 3) and protection of the environment (MDG 7). In addition, they acknowledge the growing interdependence among the states and the influence that the international context has on the countries’ development possibilities, particularly the wealthier countries’ commitment to facilitate the poorer countries’ access to their markets (MDG 8).

32. See http://www.oecd.org/EN/home/0,EN-home-66-2-no-no-no,00.html
33. See http://www.paris21.org/betterworld/ The PARIS 21 Consortium was formed in November of 1999. Its founders are the U.N., OECD, World Bank, International Monetary Fund and EU.
ambiante (ODM 7). Además reconocen la interdependencia creciente entre los Estados y la influencia del contexto internacional en las posibilidades de desarrollo de los países, particularmente el compromiso de los países ricos de facilitar el acceso a sus mercados para los países pobres (ODM 8).

On the other hand, the main interest placed on “measuring results” according to the proposed indicators, constitutes an important limitation, as much for the selection of countries to receive aid as for the determination of cooperation actions that don’t correspond with the indicators. The preoccupation with effectiveness is aimed at quantifying “global results”, thus limiting the range of action and the possibilities for adapting aid to particular contexts and needs.

After the Millennium Summit, there was a series of international and inter-governmental encounters which influenced the reconfiguration of the system, among them, the International Conference on Financing for Development (the Monterrey Consensus), held in March of 2002. Closely related to the MDGs, its objective was to reach agreements with regard to the mobilization of the necessary resources to achieve them.

There were two central points in this consensus: increase financing for development—a clear necessity for the developing countries— and improve the efficiency of cooperation. Regarding the first point, although there was no concrete agreement concerning specific sums, there was a consensus on the need to increase the flow of ODA. Some alternative development financing mechanisms, however, were ruled out, such as the issue of different financial instruments, the use of reserves held by international financial institutions and “global taxes”, such as the Tobin Tax, the taxes on carbon emissions or for the use of World Heritage sites.

In this respect, Monterrey saw the continuity of the dominance of the neoliberal model, not only in ruling out these alternatives, but also in affirming that commerce and private investment are the principal sources for development financing, and that ODA plays a subsidiary role in the case of “market failures”.

Regarding the second point, the efficiency of aid, the donors made a commitment to modify some mechanisms, such as making the operational procedures smoother in order to reduce transaction costs, strengthen the recipient countries’ capacity for absorption and financial management, make the resource flow more predictable through the use of instruments such as budget support, and supply aid through plans for development and reduction of poverty defined by the developing countries themselves.

Following the points outlined in Monterrey, the Paris Declaration of 2005 constituted a milestone in the transformation process of the development cooperation system, and also currently has an important impact on South-South cooperation. This declaration was the result of the High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in March of 2005, in which there was participation from developed as well as developing countries. Centered on the preoccupation concerning the efficiency of ODA, the Paris Declaration institutionalized five guidelines for its distribution: ownership, alignment, harmonization, results and mutual accountability. These principles had already been discussed within the OECD and the World Bank, but in Paris they acquired a different status, as they were part of a consensus between developed and developing countries. The Declaration as a whole reflects the preference of the concept “effectiveness-selectivity” of aid, insomuch as it institutes the idea of “good government” as conditional for receiving it. At the same time, it also places the State at

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“...the Paris Declaration of 2005 constituted a milestone in the transformation process of the development cooperation system, and also currently has an important impact on South-South cooperation...”

the center of responsibility, and cooperation as a State-centered flow, committing the donors to strengthening institutions in countries where they are weak or don’t reflect the ideal of “good government”36. By means of the principles and indicators established for 2010, the Declaration establishes the guidelines for the selection and execution of North-South cooperation.

The impact of the Paris Declaration on South-South cooperation has been in relation to the application of these principles, and has led to a division between those developing countries that are in favor of them and those that would prefer a different model. Both the preparations as well as the meeting itself of the Third High-level Forum held in Accra in late 2008 showed these differences and made difficult a consensus of the southern countries concerning the rules for cooperation among them.

A third point that contributes to the creation of the context of development cooperation in the new century, is the discussion on “middle-income” countries. This form of classification, proposed by the World Bank, implies equating a country’s development and their GDP per capita and led to the formation of three groups of countries: low-income, middle-income37 and high-income. This categorization began to be utilized as a selection criterion for ODA, with highest priority being given to the low-income countries. This led to an important international debate regarding which countries could be considered middle-income and what their role was in cooperation. Spain and Latin America have played an important part in this debate, as it is a strategic one for the adopted modality and the cooperation that take place in the Ibero-American sphere.

The characterization of most of the Latin American countries as middle-income, in the context of a global strategy in which the focus of ODA funds revolves around the reduction of poverty, has meant a considerable decline in financing and, above all, in symbolic terms, the loss of Latin America’s position in the center of participation within the group of developing countries”.

36. The central position given to the State has also had its detractors. For Sanahuja, the Paris Declaration “...seems headed toward a recreation of the ‘Developmental State’ on a new foundation, as it is limited to the relations between state players. This reflects a narrow view of development and democratic governance, a process which also involves other players”, Sanahuja, op. cit. p. 96.

37. The “middle-income” category is also subdivided into “upper middle income” and “lower middle income”.
The international cooperation policies for the so-called “middle-income countries”, or emerging economies, tend to propose a similar relational system as that of North-South cooperation (donor/recipient, with the corresponding asymmetries), but with a thematic content aimed at generating stable macroeconomic contexts rather than resolving the “social issues” of development in these countries\(^3\). These transformations have forced the Latin American countries to reconsider their role in the international cooperation system—as requesters and donors of cooperation, known as the “dual role”-. Spain, for instance, has decided not only to support this strategy, but also openly pushes for it.

In this debate on middle-income countries, two key issues have been identified: on the one hand, these countries’ claims as recipients of development cooperation. On the other, the responsibility attributed to them as “new donors” and their role in South-South and triangular cooperation.

Within the framework of the Conferences of Ibero-American Heads of State this issue began to be mentioned and incorporated into the special communiqués and Final Declarations. Spain was host to the 1st International Conference of Middle-income Countries, held in Madrid on March 1st and 2nd of 2007. The second took place in San Salvador from October 2nd to October 4th, and the third in Namibia, from the 4th to the 6th of August of 2008. The choice of using per capita income as an indicator of development, among all the arguments used to defend the continuity of ODA, was questioned for being merely economic in nature. This choice has become outdated as it responds to the conception of development which was being used when the classifications by level of income were elaborated. These countries’ claim was made clear in the Special Communiqué of the 17th Ibero-American Summit held in Santiago, Chile (2007). At this summit, the participants expressed “…the support and implementation of the ‘El Salvador Consensus’ on development cooperation with middle-income countries, which mainly calls out to the international community to: continue giving cooperation and support to the national efforts of the middle-income countries in their struggle against poverty and inequality, and to achieve the Millennium Development Goals; consider additional criteria apart from per capita income in determining recipients of international cooperation; and promote new and innovative modalities and instruments for cooperation and international financing; as well as supporting more actively formulas for horizontal and triangular cooperation, inserting the referenced topics in the work agendas of the pertinent international forums in order to more effectively instrument this initiative”.

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\(^3\) Proof of this is the analysis put forth by the very “Ibero-American South-South Cooperation Report” concerning the relation between development profiles and cooperation needs. It points out that as the income of these countries increases, the cooperation needs begin to move away from the more basic areas of health, food and education. (SEGIB, 2007).
Both international conferences on middle-income countries, as well as academic works, have shown the multiple challenges that must be faced within the system of international cooperation. They point out the importance of paying more attention to the development needs of the middle-income countries; of acknowledging the variety and diversity of these countries, while recommending consideration of the international heritage of shared principles; the importance of promoting good practices, experiences and South-South cooperation; as well as the validity of these countries having a greater voice and representation in the multilateral financial organizations, among others.

“...The characterization of most of the Latin American countries as middle-income, in the context of a global strategy in which the focus of ODA funds revolves around the reduction of poverty, has meant a considerable decline in financing...”

39. Among these, one which is worth noting is Alonso, José Antonio, “Países de renta media: justificación y ámbitos de trabajo”, ICEI. Madrid 2008.
One more sign of the described changes in the development cooperation system are the important conceptual differences on South-South cooperation that are present today. This elusiveness in the definition is a characteristic that can be found in both multilateral and national spheres. In order to detect these disparities and conceptual nuances it was necessary to analyze, given their relevance, the documents from the United Nations and the OECD, paying special attention to the way the topic was approached in the most recent international conferences held in 2008. On a national level, there was an analysis of a representative sample of Latin American countries that reflect the relation between cooperation and foreign policy.
2.1 The definition in multilateral spheres

30 years after the Buenos Aires Declaration, and with the limitations and difficulties of the neoliberal development model, the beginning of the new century sees cooperation among countries once again begin to occupy a prominent place in international discussions. It is once again portrayed as a "new dimension" of cooperation, insomuch as its content is once again redefined.

In the year 2000, the countries that gathered for the South Summit decided to give new drive to the coordination of cooperation actions between them, within the framework of the United Nations. In this way, they agreed to,

"...invite the administrator of the UNDP to strengthen the Special Unit for Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries as the coordination center for South-South cooperation within the United Nation, preserving its independent identity and providing it with the resources to guarantee the full implementation of the decisions made at the South Summit under its area of competence, and so it can fulfill its mandates and responsibilities."

From the beginning of the millennium, there have been aspects of South-South cooperation that have remained constant and some that have changed, with respect to the 1990's as well as to the modifications evidenced by the international context.

As far as the aspects that have remained constant, within the sphere of the United Nations, there remains, like in the 90's, the idea that South-South cooperation constitutes a means to improve insertion into the economic order characterized by an intense process of globalization of the markets as well as production, and not a means to transform it. There remains the idea of TCDC as a mechanism of adaptation to the international economic order, considering that it is possible and beneficial for all the countries to participate "effectively" in it. In 2003, for example, it was highlighted that "The great changes that have occurred in the international economic system since 1980 - mainly, the globalization of markets and production structures, and the movement towards establishing a worldwide liberal free trade system - have accentuated the continued validity and relevance of TCDC as an instrument to assist developing countries to participate effectively in the emerging new international order."

In relation to this idea, there was a greater integration of the concepts of "technical cooperation among developing countries" and "economic cooperation," under the notion of "South-South." From the previous decade, developing countries, and the international community in general, insisted on the need to place greater emphasis on the latter. But the idea of "South" now refers to a group which is more diverse, yet at the same time, highly integrated within a global system, leading to the term "global south", which is frequently used in the present day.
“...the idea of ‘South’ now refers to a group which is more diverse, yet at the same time, highly integrated within a global system, leading to the term ‘global south’...”

In this sense, and taking as a base the Havana Declaration of the South Summit of 2000, the High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation decided to change the name of the “Special Unit for TCDC” to “Special Unit for South-South Cooperation” 42.

Economic cooperation was thus reaffirmed as a relevant dimension of the relations between the southern countries, to be promoted by the UNDP. In the biennial report for 2005-2006 elaborated by the High-level Committee for South-South Cooperation, there is an important emphasis placed on different processes of economic relations that are considered to be part of South-South cooperation: processes of regional integration, volumes of intra- and inter-regional commerce and even the direct foreign investment that has taken place among southern countries.

Although the transformation of the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation reflects a continuity from the previous decade with regard to the importance of economic cooperation, there has also been evidence of some changes. The choice to use the concept of “South-South” implies broadening the reach of the very concept of cooperation among developing countries.

The activity of the UNDP in this field was redefined in relation to three interrelated areas: political dialogue and development, exchange of knowledge concerning development of the South, and public-private associations (graph 1) 43. Even though the second area represents the traditional field of action of technical cooperation, it takes on a new dimension in the multilateral plane through the utilization of new information and communication technologies. Through the construction of the WIDE (Web of Information for Development) system, the UNDP tries to consolidate the largest database on the capabilities available in the southern countries, in order to facilitate the spread of information among them concerning institutions, experiences, technologies...

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42. This decision was included in Resolution 58/220 of the General Assembly.

43. These three pillars established the base for the Third Cooperation Framework for South-South Cooperation, which serves to coordinate the different U.N. organizations.
and cooperation practices. It also constitutes an important reassessment of the technologies and knowledge which are native to these countries and their potential for development.

Graph 1: Areas of South-South cooperation promoted by the UNDP

In the area of political dialogue, there is an attempt to promote the exchange of information on development strategies between the southern countries, as well as the coordination of policies through summits and discussion forums on such topics as the environment, gender issues, and food security, among others.

With regard to public-private associations, the goal is to promote links between companies as a component of this cooperation, reflecting not only the interrelation between the "technical" and "economic" aspects, but also the inclusion of non-state players, specifically from the market. It is worth noting that the inclusion of these players represents a significant change with respect to the definition elaborated in the Buenos Aires Plan, which defined TCDC as a field solely for state action.

A second change has to do with a strong results-oriented outlook. There is a growing concern with effectiveness and efficiency in South-South cooperation, which no doubt refers to the same evaluation process as for North-South cooperation. It is significant that this concern seems to imply separating South-South cooperation from political ties and interests. The Special Unit for South-South Cooperation claimed that its principal objective was to take South-South cooperation beyond the matters related to political solidarity and focus more on results.\(^{44}\)

The third change identified within the sphere of the United Nations was to incorporate triangular cooperation. The Special Unit for South-South Cooperation integrated both fields acknowledging that its principal mandate was to:

"...promote, coordinate and support South-South and triangular cooperation on the basis of an extensive global system as well as the United Nations."\(^{45}\)

This results in the incorporation of a North-South dimension to cooperation among developing countries. There is a clearly symmetrical discourse regarding both modalities of cooperation with regard...
to their ends and the advantages they represent in terms of greater effectiveness and efficiency. Taking these requirements as the central issue, there is a tendency to equate South-South cooperation to triangular cooperation, as they both constitute ways of utilizing the capabilities of the developing world in order for it to benefit itself and at a lower cost.

In some cases, triangular cooperation has been labeled a “modality” of South-South cooperation. This identification is based on actions of technical cooperation, and implies a distinction between three types of players: a “funder”, which can be a developed country or an international organization, an “implementer” and a “recipient”, both of these referring to developing countries. In this way, South-South cooperation is divided into categories that define roles and contributions, a division of tasks between a developed “donor”, capable of financing the actions, and a developing one which contributes know-how. There is also the passive role of the “recipient”.

Lastly, the final change in the evolution of the concept as of the year 2000 was its link to the idea of “transnational threats”, which clearly reflects the influence of security issues on aid. Some documents explicitly mention the fight against terrorism as an incentive for South-South cooperation, and argue that this cooperation constitutes a “response” to this type of threat. This indicates a break between South-South cooperation and its original intent and motivation: to collectively overcome the problems of the developing world.

Throughout 2008, on the eve of the next International Conference on Cooperation among Developing Countries, there have been several international encounters related to development cooperation which have taken on the topic of South-South cooperation and are relevant to identify nuances and differences in the way that it is conceptualized. By analyzing the documents elaborated at these events it is possible to make some observations related to the players that promote it and the conceptual treatment given to it.

The players that have most ardently pressed for the treatment of South-South cooperation have been Spain, on the one hand, and the Latin American countries on the other. Spain, due to its linguistic and historical ties, presents itself as the natural representative for the region before the EU and attempts to capitalize on the synergies in other international forums. This explains why in 2008 the first series of meetings was promoted by the Ibero-American General Secretariat [Secretaria General Iberoamericana or SEGIB]. In keeping with the mandates established during the 17th Ibero-American Summit (Chile, 2007), the SEGIB sponsored the discussion on South-South cooperation. These debates, based on the “Report on Cooperation in Ibero-America,” constitute one of the few efforts of the international community to conceptualize South-South cooperation.

This document contains a brief analysis based on the traditional concepts of cooperation (donor/recipient, multilateral/bilateral, horizontal/triangular), blurring the approach which takes the vertical aspect and the asymmetries as central variables of the analysis of cooperation relations.
This is not a minor omission, as it assumes the “good” nature of South-South relations, given by the condition of being of the “South,” which is simply seen as belonging to the group of developing nations\textsuperscript{48}.

Although the document makes a distinction between developing countries as being “low-income,” “middle-income” and “high-income,” the fact that these countries have historically been “recipients” of aid ensures a form of empathy when in the role of “donors”. This puts South-South cooperation in a privileged position in comparison to other modalities due to its flexibility to adapt to local realities.

These issues were brought up for discussion in several meetings held by the SEGIB. In particular, the meeting in Cali (July, 2008), which counted with extensive participation from cooperation representatives and Latin American academics, allowed for a more complex approach on the matter, although there was no effect on the San Salvador Declaration of the 18th Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State and Government\textsuperscript{49}.

“A second series of meetings, pushed forward in 2008 by the organizations belonging to the United Nations, was strongly linked to the debates and discussions related to the “management” of development aid. The 3rd High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Accra (Ghana) in 2008 and the preparatory events leading up to it, and, in a smaller measure, the meetings linked to the International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Doha at the end of that year, constructed a favorable environment in which the international community could once again approach the topic of South-South cooperation.

“...there is a tendency to equate South-South cooperation to triangular cooperation...”

\textsuperscript{48} SEGIB, Informe de la Cooperación en Iberoamérica 2007.

\textsuperscript{49} Although there was a “Special communiqué on development cooperation with middle-income countries” it does not address the topic of South-South cooperation.
In spite of that, it was not a central topic of the declarations. The Accra Agenda for Action constitutes a plan for evaluation and follow-up to the Paris Declaration where suggestions are collected from the preliminary discussions and measures are proposed that will highlight the role of the recipient countries in the coordination and leadership of the development actions, as a means of increasing the efficiency of aid. South-South cooperation is thus used as a “learning tool” which will allow others to learn from the experiences of those developing countries that have been able to overcome some problems.

In Accra, efforts were made to avoid the same criticism made of North-South cooperation, stating that, “Cooperation for South-South development must observe the principle of non-interference in internal matters, establish equality between the associates in development and respect their independence, national sovereignty, cultural diversity and identity, and local content.” It is worth noting that these principles, taken today as primary themes for discussion by the central countries, were integral in South-South cooperation throughout its history, and were already present in 1978.

Lastly, in the documents linked to the follow-up of the Monterrey Consensus (Doha, 2008) there was also a highlighting of the virtues of South-South cooperation in improving the effectiveness of aid, while at the same time insisting on its complementarity with North-South modalities. In this respect, it followed the same line of arguments heard at the events in Accra, which tend to subordinate the discussion of South-South cooperation within the framework of the North-South discussions concerning the effectiveness of aid.

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50. We are referring to the meeting held in Santa Marta, Colombia for the “Latin American and Caribbean Regional Consultation in Preparation for the Accra High-level Forum” in June 2008.
2.2 South-South cooperation as part of foreign policy in Latin American countries

Parallel to its conceptual evolution, it is important to observe the definition and the place given to this type of cooperation by the countries of the “South”, and how it's linked to their foreign policies. In this respect, it was deemed necessary to analyze the main conceptual themes that sustain the definition of South-South cooperation in a sampling of Latin American countries. This type of analysis is considered to be of the utmost importance when defining a joint strategy aimed at positioning the region in the principal international forums of discussion.

A particular characteristic of the 1990's was the fact that many Latin American countries created institutions within the governmental structure whose function was to coordinate development cooperation activities, both in their capacity as “recipients” and “donors”. An important chapter in these institutions was dedicated to cooperation among developing countries, also known as “horizontal cooperation” or “TCDC”.

In the cases observed, there were two forms detected for conceiving this type of cooperation. On the one hand, there were references to a conceptual theme of “supply and demand”, in many cases using the terms “offerer” or “donor” and “recipient”, and defining the actions of cooperation as a lineal, unidirectional sequence, involving a “transfer” (of knowledge, experience, etc.). This becomes evident, for example, in the cooperation application form used by Colombia, which distinguishes between “requester” and “offerer”. This is also seen in the use of these terms in Argentina, where it is stated that the Argentine Fund for Horizontal Cooperation (Fondo Argentino de Cooperación Horizontal or FO-AR
allows for the provision of human and/or financial resources aimed at “transferring” technical, administrative and technological capabilities.

On the other hand, in different countries horizontal cooperation is repeatedly referred to as a tool to “build up” and “strengthen” local capabilities in a context of mutual learning. For example the Chilean Agency for International Cooperation (Agencia de Cooperación Internacional de Chile or AGCI) highlights that one of its guidelines for horizontal cooperation is the “commitment to building capabilities” as a way to “contribute to the process of developing individual, collective and institutional abilities of the countries, allowing them to resolve their problems and reach their objectives”⁵¹. In the case of Brazil, they mention that the crucial point is strengthening the institutions of their partners, as a necessity for a rapid and effective transfer and absorption of knowledge, which comes afterwards⁵². Paradoxically, despite the form described, Colombia defines TCDC as an alternative in order to establish partners “willing to share their comparative advantages, resources, knowledge and lessons learned”⁵³. The case of Colombia shows how the two conceptions don’t correspond to two groups of countries, but that they can also overlap in the policies of a single country.

In addition to the general objective of contributing to the development of other countries, cooperation among developing countries has also been defined as part of their foreign policies. Peru states that “it is an instrument of Peruvian foreign policy, which reinforces the ties with developing countries”⁵⁴. Chile includes as an objective of this cooperation to “support the objectives and priorities of the foreign policy of the government of Chile”⁵⁵. Brazil considers it a “strategic option for association...” which “promotes the strengthening of its relations, as well as its political and economic ties”⁵⁶.

As an instrument of foreign policy, this cooperation is associated with the intention to strengthen the country’s “presence” in the region. Cooperation between developing countries is defined in this context as a means to establish a positive presence in other countries, based as much on political will as technical capabilities to make a contribution in development. In this sense, in

“...In addition to the general objective of contributing to the development of other countries, cooperation among developing countries has also been defined as part of their foreign policies...”
Argentina it is worth noting, for example, that the FO-AR has the objective of “…contributing to the development of neighbor countries, strengthening bilateral relations and consolidating Argentine presence in those countries…”57. Colombia’s technical cooperation proposes not only to “promote national capabilities” in other countries, but is also directed toward strengthening the “presence of Colombia in the context of developing countries, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean”58. In the case of Cuba, the relation between cooperation and foreign policy has its own particular characteristics. In this case, the goal is to project an economic and social model that allows for the implementation of a model for independent development. Because of this, it is mentioned that Cuba “…acts from the premise that this type of cooperation constitutes an important instrument for stimulating and strengthening economic independence and advancing toward true development”59.

Although it is true that in most cases the relation between foreign policy and cooperation plays an important part in the region, the case of Brazil differs in its projection on a global scale. For this, there is a greater use of the term South-South cooperation, as opposed to horizontal or TCDC. Defined as one of the pillars of Brazilian foreign policy since 2002, South-South cooperation emphasizes the aspect of political dialogue, highlighting cases like the Brazil-Africa Forum, periodical meetings with Arab countries and the IBSA Dialogue Forum with India and South Africa, among other examples.

One final aspect worth mentioning refers particularly to the type of financing for cooperation between developing countries. Some countries, such as Chile, operate on the basis of the belief that this cooperation implies “shared costs.” The case of Mexico is striking, as it uses the terms “vertical” and “horizontal” not with regard to the level of relative development of the cooperating country, but with regard to the financing scheme. In this way, cooperation is horizontal if the cooperating countries share the costs and vertical if only one of them finances the activities. This allows them to say that they also carry out horizontal cooperation in a North-South context and vertical in South-South cooperation. For countries like Argentina, Peru and Colombia, the question of financing does not enter into the definition, so that activities can have shared costs or be financed through concessional funds established by the country providing cooperation.

To summarize, the following particularities can be observed of cooperation among developing countries as national policy in Latin America:
- A predominance of the concepts of “TCDC” and “horizontal cooperation” as opposed to “South-South cooperation.
- An overlapping of a “supply/demand” scheme and a cooperation scheme, understood as a mutual exchange and learning process.
- The conception of cooperation as an instrument of foreign policy directed toward the strengthening of a positive presence, essentially in other countries in the region.
- A political orientation toward the world stage in the case of Brazil.
- Divergences between the countries with regard to whether or not to incorporate the type of financing as part of the definition.

59. Alín, Damián 2006 “Cuba-CARICOM. Por el mar de las Antillas. Una relación que no cesa de crecer” in Bohemia (Havana) Year 98, Nº 25, December 8th, 46-47
3. Conceptual contributions

The descriptions and considerations previously developed have allowed for the elaboration of a series of contributions whose end would be to serve as a base to articulate definitions concerning South-South cooperation. There is no doubt that these contributions also imply a political vision which seeks to build spaces of agreement within the diversity of the “peripheral” countries.

a) Valuing the political nature and the objectives for change of South-South cooperation.

The political nature of South-South cooperation implies acknowledgement of the link between this form of cooperation and the foreign policy of developing countries. Undoubtedly, this link is problematic, as it tends to define cooperation actions more as a response to national interests of one of the sides than to the real needs of the other. This would be the same criticism traditionally made of North-South cooperation. One possible solution would be for the developing countries to agree to define foreign policy based on multilateral and supportive interests. This would imply once again putting in the center of the discussion the objectives for promoting change in the international system through collective action. The current global economic crisis has made evident the difficulties of this system, and represents an opportunity, if not to push forward a radical change, but to introduce “spaces for change” in favor of peripheral countries.

South-South cooperation should, thus, become a focal point around which developing countries should structure foreign policy, and not simply be seen as an “instrument” in the service of “national interests”. The proposal should, then, be to change the entity of South-South cooperation into the constitutional element of all foreign policy, its structural base, and discard its instrumental definition.

b) Specifying the particular characteristics of South-South cooperation

Both from the perspective of the theory, as well as the practical experience, there is a consensus concerning some particular characteristics and advantages presented by South-South cooperation and which it is important to highlight. In the first place, this approach to cooperation is based on the idea of “mutual aid,” as opposed to the more “welfare-oriented” notion of giving “charitable aid.” This approach has, from the very beginning, implied respect for sovereign rule and the search for shared benefits in a variable sum game. The natural consequence of this approach is to discard from the language used in South-South cooperation those references to the categories of “donor”, “recipient”, “supply” and “demand.” In the second place, the cooperating countries face similar development challenges on a local and global level, which makes it easier to adapt actions to common needs and perspectives. Third, in regional spheres, developing countries share aspirations and experiences with regard to the building and developing of a nation, historical similarities, and cultural ties, which helps mutual understanding and can improve the effectiveness of projects.

Acknowledging these characteristics is essential for consolidating a shared definition of South-South cooperation.

60. Some of these characteristics were looked at in ZHOU, Yiping, “Ampliando los puentes de la cooperación Sur-Sur” in Capítulos del SELA, 64, Jan.-Apr. 2002, pp.44-45.
However, it is also important, though less explicit, to specify what “is not necessarily” South-South cooperation. It is not, essentially, an instrument meant to improve the effectiveness of North-South cooperation through triangulation. This is not to say that contributions from “traditional” donors through this modality cannot be of great benefit in promoting South-South actions, but it is important to make the distinction between the two modalities. It also is not a response to “transnational threats,” but rather a collective response to problems associated with the development of peripheral nations. Lastly, it is not a form of cooperation that necessarily implies a certain degree of concession. This means that the idea of “donation” or “non-refundable contribution” may or may not be present, but it is not a constitutional element of the definition of this cooperation.

c) Recognizing the wide range of actions that constitute South-South cooperation and attempting to articulate them in the search for widespread development.

As is stated in the conceptual description elaborated in the present work, South-South cooperation is a space for ties on multiple levels, which covers actions of technical, economic, commercial, social and political cooperation. Recognizing the multiple levels implies acknowledging that development requires an assortment of coordinated actions in the area of foreign policy. This coordination requires internal coherence between the different state agencies and external coherence in the different areas of multilateral discussion. As a consequence, it is essential that development become the core issue of foreign policy in the southern states.

d) Elaborating a definition with regard to a new notion of the “South”.

Although the notion of “horizontal” is useful in identifying a symmetrical form of cooperation, between countries with a similar level of development it has sometimes been used to refer to a parity with regard to the financing of the cooperation. It would, thus, be worth retaking the notion of “South” not in a geographical sense, but as a concept which groups the countries that have been on the periphery of the development of the nations with greater social and economic well-being. Accepting this conception of the “South” also implies recognizing the great cultural, economic, political and social diversity of the periphery, considered in the idea of the “global South”. In this way, the notion of the “South” would constitute an identity based on a shared and diverse structural reality, and not on the promise of advancing in a lineal evolutionary
pathlineal, where countries are placed in a scale of “degrees” or levels of development.

e) Distinguishing between North-South triangular cooperation and South-South multilateral actions.

Given the current discussions and the relevance of the topic, it becomes necessary to clearly identify triangular cooperation as a modality of North-South cooperation. As such, it implies negotiation and agreement that respects the particular characteristics and visions of three “partners” with a common goal: to contribute to the development of a country through specific and concrete action. The coordination of the partners needs to occur on two levels: a strategic level, where the objectives of cooperation are jointly defined, and an operational level, where the contributions and roles of each partner are agreed upon. The recounting of some experiences makes evident a predominance of the second level, and an absence, or at least difficulty in implementation of, the first level.

In contrast, the actions of multilateral cooperation among developing countries represent a modality of South-South cooperation essentially aimed at attaining collective benefits.

4. Political and institutional recommendations for Argentina

In closing, it becomes pertinent to make some recommendations regarding Argentine policy on South-South cooperation, on the basis of the conceptual contributions made, and in an attempt to contribute to it becoming a reality from a perspective aimed at extending internal debate and the positions taken in the international plane.

The recommendations are made on two different, yet interrelated, levels: a) The propositions that Argentina can make to achieve a consensus with other states on how to configure the space of South-South cooperation and b) the internal definitions that will contribute to a better performance on the part of Argentina in South-South cooperation.

On the first level, the proposals are:

» Reach a consensus on a broad definition of South-South cooperation, which includes the technical, political and economic dimensions, but articulated keeping in mind the general development of peripheral societies.

» Reach a consensus on the direction of South-South cooperation, aimed at areas that are of high priority to peripheral nations, such as education, science, technology, protection of the environment, the fight against poverty, gender issues, energy production and supply, and infrastructure.

» Push for a broader discussion on the countries of intermediate development, without accepting the term “middle-income”. On the North-South level, this discussion should be aimed at defining a different form of cooperation, concerning
“...The Foreign Ministry should define South-South cooperation as one of the structural pillars of Argentine foreign policy...”

different principles and modalities from those involved in cooperation with countries that have greater difficulties in development and lower levels of growth. In that respect, Argentina needs to study and revalue its local capabilities and the contributions it can make, as much for local projects as in the search for solutions to global problems.

» Elaborate regional studies of cooperation actions that have been carried out, with a general evaluation which compares different regions, which would allow for the identification of successful methodologies, improve aspects of implementation and management, and analyze the results obtained. This would allow for agreement on cooperation principles and the “operationalization” of specific indicators for South-South cooperation.

» Institutionalize channels that allow for the exchange of experiences, in order to count on comparable and reliable information. There could be an “Observatory” within a regional institution, such as SELA, to analyze actions and tendencies of South-South cooperation. To do this, there could be involvement on a university level.

» Promote a greater synergy between the multilateral and bilateral spheres. South-South cooperation has rested mainly on bilateral agreements strongly associated with other foreign policy interests. Multilateral organizations, on the other hand, represent spaces that are more open and flexible to carry out different actions. This characteristic allows for direct participation of different state agencies that find the space to develop cooperation initiatives relevant to their own realms of action. It is important to establish communication mechanisms that ensure coherence and increase the synergy between multilateral and bilateral initiatives.

On the second level, the proposals for improving Argentina’s cooperation policy are:

» The Foreign Ministry should define South-South cooperation as one of the structural pillars of Argentine foreign policy and organize the activities of the different areas to contribute to it.

» On an operational level, it should also define strategic lines that are sustainable in time, as well as generate multi-year projects that will enable the evaluation of results and effects.

» Considering the diversity of actions and the multiple government levels that participate in South-South cooperation, it becomes recommendable to organize an inter-ministry and multi-level (national, provincial, municipal) area, coordinated by the Argentine Foreign Ministry, whose main functions would be:

a- Coordinate the elaboration of a “Strategic plan for Argentina in the System of
International Cooperation,” which takes into account its dual role and establishes a framework for multi-year policies, in which South-South cooperation is one of the central points, considering its relevance in bilateral and multilateral relations.

b- Draw up a “map” of cooperations, especially South-South, to lend coherence to the process of cooperation.

c- Promote an effective and institutionalized coordination and record of the activities of all the players of cooperation on the national, provincial and municipal levels, as well as of those from the organized civilian sector.

» The Directorate General for International Cooperation, as point of coordination in this area of policy, could generate concrete initiatives that contribute to improving South-South cooperation activities in different fields. Among these could be:

a) **Organization of “capacity building” seminars** (to be held with countries that participate in a cooperation agreement or process) in order to avoid ambiguous/erroneous objectives and wasteful use of resources, and improve decisions on which sectors need to improve or expand, the most convenient times to carry out cooperation actions, etc.

b) **Carry out a detailed statistical control of all cooperation offered by and to Argentina, as well as that effectively given and received, on the South-South level.** This activity should be linked to the suggestion of the diagram of cooperations which shows the relations on the different levels, national, provincial and municipal.
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ACRONYMS

ODA    Official Development Assistance
DAC    Development Assistance Committee
ECDC   Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries
TCDC   Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries
ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council
IBSA   India, Brazil and South Africa
G77    The Group of 77
OECD   Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
MDG    Millennium Development Goals
U.N.   United Nations Organization
OSPAAAL Organización de Solidaridad con los Pueblos de América Latina, Asia y África (Organization of Solidarity of the People of Asia, Africa and Latin America)
UNDP   United Nations Development Program
MIC    Middle-income Country
SEGIB  Secretaría General Iberoamericana (Ibero-American General Secretariat)
SELA   Sistema Económico Latinoamericano (Latin American Economic System)
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
Report

IBEROAMERICAN

ACADEMIC MEETING
ON INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION
In the city of San Martin (Argentina), on the 5th and 6th of November, 2009, the persons responsible for post-graduate degrees, research centers and researchers on international cooperation, as well as organizations linked to these matters met at the National University of San Martin, called together by this institution, as well as by the Iberoamerican General Secretariat (Secretaría General Iberoamericana or SEGIB) and the Argentine Foreign Ministry.

The institutions present at the 1st Iberoamerican Academic Meeting on International Cooperation gathered with the purpose of creating a space for the exchange of ideas as well as reflection on practices, tendencies and perspectives on cooperation among Iberoamerican countries in order to make the academic activity in the region more dynamic concerning these issues.

On the first day, the exchanges were oriented toward assessing the current state of the research and education on International Cooperation in the region, with special emphasis on the Latin American countries. At the opening were present the General Academic Secretary of the National University of San Martin (UNSAM), Dr. Jorge Fernández Niello; the Dean of the Department of Humanities -UNSAM-, Norberto Ferré; the Director of the Masters Program on International Cooperation at UNSAM, Miguel Vallone; the Director of Planning of the Iberoamerican General Secretariat, Dr. José Maria Vera, and the Director of International Cooperation of the Argentina Foreign Ministry, Julia Levi.

Subsequently, the participating institutions were introduced through presentations on international cooperation given by representatives of the research and academic centers. It is important to note that over twenty academic institutions from fourteen different countries were present, representing every sub-region in Ibero-America.

With the final objective being the formation of an academic community that reflects systematically on international cooperation and international cooperation for development, the institutions proposed different strategies to facilitate mutual knowledge and collaboration.

One of the tools suggested was the creation of a web page which would serve to make public and accessible the information on production of knowledge and training of human resources with regard to international cooperation. For this, emphasis was put on the participation of the SEGIB and the Organization of Iberoamerican States (Organización de Estados Iberoamericanos or OEI), as emblematic players of the Iberoamerican community, to collaborate, through institutional support, in the construction of the web page and the publication and distribution of the academic products generated in Latin America.

The idea was that this tool would allow, in
time, the channelling of the institutional support coming from the different players and the formation of an Academic Network on International Cooperation within the Iberoamerican Knowledge Field. The agreement on the organizational parameters as to an organizational system based on concentric circles was substantiated by its ability to improve individual characteristics and stimulate the possibilities for complementation and cooperation between the participating players. In this way, there would be a core composed of academic institutions meeting certain requirements - teaching, research, scope and the capacity for mobility in the field of international cooperation - which would coordinate with a second circle working as “sub-networks” together with civilian and government players in international cooperation.

Both strategies are aimed at stimulating the exchange of information through the creation of common agendas for research and the development of joint publications to inform on the best results of the postgraduate plans involved. In short, they are aimed at fulfilling one of the objectives of the meeting: forming an academic community that reflects systematically on international cooperation and international cooperation for development.

On the second day the activities took place at the San Martin Palace of the Argentine Foreign Ministry. The seminar, which was open to the public, was attended by over a hundred people. The debates revolved around two main issues which aimed to address, on the one hand, the theoretical and conceptual perspectives concerning international cooperation for development around the world and in Latin America, asking the question “Where is international cooperation for development heading around the world and in Latin America?”; and on the other hand, the conceptual and methodological approaches concerning the modalities of cooperation (North-South, South-South and Triangular).

Throughout the morning, there were presentations by Jairo Agudelo Taborda, Director of the Escuela Latinoamericana de Cooperación y Desarrollo (USBCTG), Tomás
Mallo, head of the Latin America Program at the Centro de Estudios para América Latina y la Cooperación Internacional (CEALCI) of the Carolina Foundation, and Jorge Balbis, Executive Secretary of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Organizaciones de Promoción al Desarrollo (ALOP).

In the afternoon, the presenters were Cristina Xalma (SEGIB), the Report on South-South Cooperation in Ibero-America, Alejandra Kern, researcher for the CICI+D (Department of Humanities) and Grace Jaramillo, Director of the Masters Program on International Cooperation and Negotiation of the Latin American Social Sciences Institute (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales or FLACSO), Ecuador.

Every presentation proposed positions that generated interesting exchanges of opinions.

The seminar concluded with presentations from the Director of the Department of International Cooperation of the Uruguayan Office of Planning and Budget, Martín Rivero Illa, the Director of the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation, Minister Marco Farani and the Director of the General Directorate for International Cooperation of the Argentine Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Julia Levi, all of whom confirmed the interest of the national organizations on international cooperation in this kind of meeting.